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Customized Procedure in Theory and 
Reality 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier∗ 
Abstract 
Contract theory has long posited that parties can maximize 
contract value by manipulating the procedural rules that will 
apply if there is a dispute. Beyond choosing a litigation or 
arbitration forum, parties can allocate costs and fees, alter 
pleading standards, adjust evidentiary and discovery rules, and 
customize nearly every aspect of the adjudication process. In time, 
this theoretical insight became a matter of faith. The assumption 
that contracts routinely alter procedural rules spawned debate 
over the normative implications of allowing parties to dictate 
procedure. Only recently have a few studies suggested that this 
debate may lack a firm empirical foundation. 
This Article presents a comprehensive picture of dispute 
resolution practices in commercial contracts, one that corrects for 
many of the limitations of the existing research and focuses on 
both binding and non-binding mechanisms. Parties do exercise 
autonomy in structuring the rules of adjudication, but they do so 
within a limited domain. Contracts almost always specify the 
governing law and routinely designate a litigation or arbitration 
forum, and a substantial minority allocate responsibility for 
attorney fees. In arbitration, parties go further, frequently 
allocating costs, imposing expertise requirements, and shaping 
decision-making dynamics (as by requiring multiple arbitrators). 
In neither forum, however, do parties expressly modify governing 
rules of pre-trial, trial, or arbitration procedure. The findings 
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imply that it is premature to debate the normative implications of 
allowing parties to dictate judicial procedures, for contracts rarely 
employ the kinds of clauses that have provoked concern. Yet, the 
findings also call for a more complete account of procedural 
contracting—one that explains why parties do not more fully 
exercise their procedural autonomy. 
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I. Introduction 
When commercial actors negotiate contracts, they 
understand that there is some chance of a dispute. Knowing this, 
their negotiations may encompass not only their primary 
obligations but also the rules that will govern an adjudication if 
one should occur. Consider an agreement in which Seller 
promises to supply a technologically advanced product meeting 
specifications that Buyer cannot or will not provide in advance.1 
Because the product is technically complex and Buyer’s needs will 
not become clear until later, the contract cannot precisely state 
Seller’s obligations.2 But the imprecision increases the risk that, 
in a dispute over product quality, a court will be unable to detect 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Manufacturing Agreement between Ionics EMS, Inc. and 
Microtune, Ltd. Partnership (May 24, 2005) (contracting to purchase electronic 
modules and circuit boards manufactured according to specifications made at a 
later date) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The example is 
similar to one in Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 
21 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review) [hereinafter Contractualizing Procedure]. 
 2. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21 (explaining how 
technological complexity can introduce uncertainty into negotiations); see 
generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (analyzing the choice of vague or 
precise contract terms as a trade-off between investing at the front- or back-end 
of the contracting process). This is a subset of the larger problem that “[t]he 
diversity of risks tends to prevent contractual parties from designing a complete 
contract ex ante.” Eric Brousseau, Régis Coeurderoy & Camille Chaserant, The 
Governance of Contracts: Empirical Evidence on Technology Licensing 
Agreements, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 205, 209 (2007).  
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a breach by Seller.3 The prospect of adjudicator error may 
diminish Seller’s incentives to perform, and Buyer, knowing this 
to be true, may discount the price it will pay.4 Under these 
circumstances, both Seller and Buyer should be willing to commit 
to a more accurate method of adjudication, if one can be found at 
reasonable cost.5 
To accomplish this, the parties may modify the background 
rules of litigation. For example, if they want to avoid the 
unpredictable, ex post application of choice of law rules, they can 
specify the governing law in the contract.6 They can agree to 
arbitrate future disputes if they expect arbitrators to more 
accurately detect breach.7 If they prefer to go to court, they can 
                                                                                                     
 3. Contract theory often assumes that parties do not contract over non-
verifiable factors, although this assumption is inconsistent with actual 
contracting practices. On the more complex role of verifiability in enforcing and 
drafting contracts, see generally Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing 
Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008) 
(exploring conditions under which parties may adopt costly-to-verify measures); 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete 
Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994) (critiquing the binary model of 
competence in which courts either can or cannot verify compliance). 
 4. The buyer has other, also unpalatable, alternatives, such as investing 
in costly efforts to monitor Seller’s performance.  
 5. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21 (describing how 
increased accuracy can improve performance incentives). If a procedural 
arrangement disproportionately benefits one party, this may require a transfer 
payment or concession elsewhere in the agreement. Id. at 18. 
 6. See, e.g., ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 68 
(2009) (discussing the value of contracting for preferred state law); see also Erin 
A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1153–53 (2000) (critiquing prevalent approaches and 
arguing that choice of law rules should facilitate party choice). 
 7. A more formal statement of the choice between arbitration and 
litigation is that parties will select the forum that offers greater governance 
benefits, net of dispute resolution and drafting costs. See Keith N. Hylton, 
Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 209, 223–26 (2000) (discussing the link between adjudication 
forum and governance benefits); Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, 
The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise 
Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 550 (2003) (analyzing choice between 
arbitration and litigation in franchise agreements). Other considerations also 
influence the choice. For example, cost-effective enforcement may allow parties 
to economize on drafting costs by replacing precise terms with vague (and 
cheaper-to-draft) ones. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 818 (exploring the 
choice between precise and vague terms). A desire for confidentiality and other 
considerations also may lead parties to prefer arbitration, just as competing 
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specify the forum and waive (or retain) the right to a jury trial.8 
Within their chosen forum, they can change the rules allocating 
costs and attorney fees and can even try to dictate procedure in 
minute detail. Pleading standards, evidentiary and discovery 
rules, burdens of proof—all of these are potentially subject to 
party control.9 Because the possibilities are vast and exist in both 
litigation and arbitration, I will refer to such modifications 
generally as “customized adjudication” or “customized procedure.” 
Many observers, from different theoretical perspectives, 
embrace the possibilities of customized procedure, especially in 
contracts between sophisticated commercial actors.10 But even in 
                                                                                                     
considerations (such as the desire for robust appellate review) may lead them to 
favor litigation. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living With 
ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict 
Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 16 
(2013) (describing survey results in which corporate counsel reported reasons for 
selecting arbitration). 
 8. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7 (noting 
prevalence of choice of forum clauses, jury trial waivers, and other terms); 
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party 
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1342–52 (2012) (reviewing the law on party 
rulemaking and noting the limited case law discussing many possible forms of 
procedural tailoring); Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 
97 VA. L. REV. 723, 747 (2011) (“Parties are also contracting to modify the 
decision-making procedures during motion practice and trial.”); Henry S. Noyes, 
If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake Rules of Litigation in 
Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 599–607 (2007) (discussing 
various customizations to the litigation process, including jury trial waivers). 
 9. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 6–10 (listing 
potential modification to procedural rules); Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 
856–78 (identifying benefits of party control over burdens of proof and giving 
examples from commercial practice); Dodge, supra note 8, at 746–50 (identifying 
potential procedural modifications); Robert J. Rhee, Towards Procedural 
Optionality: Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 
536–540 (2009) (favoring party control over many aspects of public adjudication 
and proposing a unilateral option to shift attorney fees in exchange for 
assuming a higher burden of proof); John W. Strong, Consensual Modifications 
of the Rules of Evidence: The Limits of Party Autonomy in the Adversary System, 
80 NEB. L. REV. 159, 164 (2001) (“[P]arties are allowed wide discretion in 
determining what rules of evidence are to be enforced in a judicial 
proceeding . . . .”). 
 10. See generally Scott & Triantis, supra note 2; Contractualizing 
Procedure, supra note 1; Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the 
Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 1475 (2013) [hereinafter Changing the Litigation Game]; Choi & 
Triantis, supra note 3; Rhee, supra note 9; Michael L. Moffitt, Customized 
Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
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that context, not everyone is ready to concede “[c]ontract law’s 
sovereignty over litigation procedure.”11 Enthusiasm for party 
control is tempered by an equally rich vein of scholarship 
exploring the limits and normative implications of customized 
adjudication, especially when parties dictate procedure in public 
courts.12 
Yet for all its theoretical richness, this debate may rest on a 
shaky empirical foundation. Transactional lawyers and their 
clients, it seems, do not share the enthusiasm for customized 
procedure.13 Relevant studies are scarce but find little evidence 
that commercial contracts routinely include custom procedural 
clauses.14 These studies have shifted attention to the reasons why 
parties do not exercise their supposed procedural autonomy. 
Have enthusiasts overstated the benefits, or under estimated the 
costs, of customized procedure?15 Or is there some other reason 
contracts have been slow to adopt custom procedural clauses?16 
This Article makes two primary contributions to this 
developing field. First, it presents the most comprehensive 
                                                                                                     
REV. 461 (2007); Noyes, supra note 8. 
 11. David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
389, 391 (2014). 
 12. Prominent examples include Bone, supra note 8; Scott Dodson, Party 
Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Linda S. 
Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988); Kevin 
E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
507 (2011); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 
(2005); Dodge, supra note 8; David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A 
Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TULANE L. 
REV. 973 (2008). 
 13. See infra Part II.A (surveying existing studies, which find limited 
evidence of procedural customization). 
 14. See infra Part II.A (noting the lack of customized procedure in 
commercial agreements). 
 15. For example, Christopher Drahozal and Erin O’Hara O’Connor argue 
that the costs of producing custom clauses often exceed the benefits. See 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: 
Carve-Outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1955–61, 1990–91 
(2014) (describing procedural contracting primarily as a choice between 
litigation and arbitration, supplemented by an election to reserve certain claims 
or remedies for an alternate forum) [hereinafter Unbundling Procedure]. 
 16. See infra Parts II.B–C (describing and critiquing three prevailing 
explanations).  
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picture to date of how commercial contracts use customized 
procedure in both litigation and arbitration.17 The sample, which 
consists of over 400 contracts entered over the past fifteen years 
by a range of US and non-US parties, corrects for many of the 
methodological limits of existing research.18 Limits of the prior 
studies include (i) an emphasis on lending and corporate 
transactions, (ii) reliance on database text searches rather than 
hand coding (which risks missing relevant contracts and clauses), 
(iii) coding for only a handful of custom terms, and (iv) taking a 
static snapshot of contracting practices.19 
The findings reveal that parties routinely alter the 
background rules of litigation.20 It turns out that transactional 
lawyers and their clients do share some of the scholarly 
enthusiasm for procedural autonomy.21 Yet they exercise 
autonomy only within a limited domain.22 Contracts almost 
uniformly specify the governing law and routinely designate a 
litigation or arbitration forum (sometimes with an alternate 
forum specified for a subset of disputes).23 A substantial minority 
of contracts shifts the default rule concerning attorney fees.24 In 
addition, contracts with arbitration clauses often modify the 
governing rules of the arbitration forum.25 Again, however, the 
modifications are limited in scope.26 Arbitration clauses 
frequently impose arbitrator expertise requirements, specify the 
number of arbitrators, or allocate the costs of arbitration.27 Some 
                                                                                                     
 17. See infra Part III.A (detailing use of custom procedure in a sample of 
commercial contracts). 
 18. See infra Part III.A (describing the sample, its limits, and the limits of 
existing studies). 
 19. See infra Part III.A (critiquing previous studies).  
 20. See infra Figure 1 (finding only 6.5% of contracts lacked any 
modification to procedure, excluding choice of law agreements). 
 21. Infra Figure 1.  
 22. See infra Table 4 (demonstrating how few contracts show evidence of 
detailed procedural customization).  
 23. Infra Figure 1.  
 24. See infra Table 4 (finding that 23.9% of contracts adopt a loser-pays 
rule for attorney fees). 
 25. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (finding 92.3% of contracts 
with arbitration clauses specify the governing rules).  
 26. See infra Table 4 (listing potential custom procedural clauses). 
 27. See infra Table 5 (finding 25.3% of arbitration clauses impose some 
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also borrow well-defined rules from other contexts, as when an 
arbitration agreement imports the discovery provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.28 
What contracts almost never do—in either arbitration or 
litigation—is dictate the particulars of pre-trial and trial 
practice.29 In other words, contracts rarely modify rules of 
procedure as defined in the classic (if idealized) sense: trans-
substantive rules that govern the conduct of litigation (or 
arbitration).30 The vast majority of contracts are silent on matters 
of pleading, discovery, evidence, the order and burden of proof, 
and related topics.31 In consequence, these matters are governed 
by the procedural rules applicable by default in the forum.32 
The Article’s second contribution is to situate these findings 
into the literature on customized adjudication. I do not dwell on 
the normative arguments for and against procedural autonomy. 
Given how rarely parties modify judicial procedures, such an 
inquiry seems premature.33 Instead, I turn to the central puzzle 
                                                                                                     
kind of expertise requirements, 72.8% address the number of arbitrators, and 
52.4% allocate arbitration costs).   
 28. See infra Table 5 (finding arbitration agreements import the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure’s discovery provisions 7.6% of the time).  
 29. See infra note 371 and accompanying text (finding little evidence that 
parties routinely modify rules of pre-trial and trial procedure). 
 30. Cf. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (questioning the utility and 
feasibility of genuinely trans-substantive procedural rules); Carl Tobias, The 
Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1508 
(1992) (noting, but challenging as unattainable, the goal of creating trans-
substantive, uniform procedural rules). 
 31. See infra Table 4 (finding only 2.8% of all contracts expand document 
discovery and 1.1% address the burden of proof).  
 32. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1947 (explaining that if 
parties do not opt for their own procedural rules, courts will provide a default 
bundle).  
 33. Objections to procedural autonomy have little force in arbitration, 
which is traditionally viewed as a matter of private contract. There is reason for 
skepticism in some contexts, such as mass consumer and employment 
contracting, but a wide range of procedures should be tolerated in arbitrations 
between private commercial entities. As for contracts that anticipate resolving 
disputes in litigation, I do not mean to dismiss the objections that some authors 
have raised to forum selection clauses and other common modifications to the 
rules of litigation. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 12, at 297 (critiquing routine 
enforcement of forum selection and governing law clauses); Marcus, supra note 
12, at 987 (arguing for limits on the ability to specify procedure). Nor do I take a 
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raised by the evidence: Why don’t parties exercise their 
procedural autonomy? 
Three explanations have been offered for the rarity of 
customized procedure.34 One posits that parties do not bargain 
over procedural rules for fear of signaling litigiousness or 
inability to perform.35 A second draws a parallel between the 
process of contract innovation and product markets, where 
innovation often occurs in punctuated bursts.36 The theory here is 
that commercial actors will not embrace novel procedural clauses 
until spurred into action by an exogenous event, such as a major 
judicial opinion upholding the use of a novel procedural clause.37 
The third explanation emphasizes the costs of identifying and 
designing procedural rules.38 Simply put, parties can capture 
many of the benefits of customized procedure by using forum 
selection and arbitration clauses to allocate disputes to their 
preferred forum(s).39 Having done so, they may find it too costly 
to decide whether they have anything to gain by drafting 
additional custom procedures.40 
The findings detailed in this Article complicate each of these 
explanations.41 On the whole, the signaling explanation fares 
poorly.42 Most contracts include at least one clause related to 
                                                                                                     
view on the degree to which parties should be allowed to control judicial 
procedure. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 12 (challenging the assumption that 
parties should be allowed to dictate litigation procedure). I simply note that the 
rarity of procedural customization diminishes the urgency of the normative 
debate. 
 34. These explanations are described in Parts II.B and C. 
 35. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (examining the “negative 
signal” theory).  
 36. See Michael L. Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological 
Discontinuities and Organizational Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 439, 460 
(1986) (examining patterns of technological change).  
 37. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 428–29 (suggesting that a Supreme 
Court decision approving use of a procedural modification might prompt 
widespread adoption of the clause). 
 38. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1949–50 (suggesting 
parties should choose the arbitration provider or jurisdiction with the most 
beneficial bundle of procedures). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See infra Part V (evaluating these theories against the data). 
 42. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the negative signaling account is hard 
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dispute resolution, and the clauses vary from contract to contract 
in ways that suggest active negotiation.43 These facts imply that 
dispute resolution is not a taboo subject during negotiations. The 
contract-as-product model fares somewhat better, though it too is 
hard to square with the sheer variety of dispute resolution 
clauses in use today.44 As for the third explanation, the findings 
are generally consistent with the theory that procedural rules can 
be prohibitively costly to draft.45 Yet customized adjudication is 
not confined, as this theory arguably implies, to the allocation of 
disputes to one or more preferred forums.46 To the contrary, 
parties contract over a much wider range of matters, especially in 
arbitration.47 
The question remains, however, why parties do not embrace 
customized procedure more fully. Perhaps the most intriguing 
finding is that contracts tend towards “coarse” rather than 
“granular” modifications to the rules of adjudication.48 I use these 
terms loosely, as a shorthand way to describe the tendency (i) to 
embrace clauses that shape the background or incentives of the 
adjudicator or broadly alter the parties’ incentives to invest in (or 
abuse) the adjudication process, (ii) and to eschew clauses that 
dictate what claims the parties may file, when they may file 
them, or what pre-trial or trial tactics they may employ. As an 
example, contracts routinely adopt a loser-pays rule with respect 
to attorney fees, and one consequence of this choice is to reduce 
incentives to abuse discovery.49 Yet, contracts almost never 
                                                                                                     
to square with the fact that contracts frequently modify at least some of the 
rules of litigation).  
 43.  Infra Part V.A. 
 44. See infra Part V.A (questioning whether the contract-as-product model 
explains contracting patterns).   
 45. See infra Part V.B (“On the whole, the findings discussed in Part III are 
consistent with the account offered by Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor . . . .”).  
 46. See infra Part V.B (describing wider range of procedural 
customization).  
 47. See infra Table 6 (documenting use of additional procedural clauses in 
arbitration agreements).  
 48. See infra Part V.B (distinguishing coarse from granular procedural 
modifications). 
 49. See infra notes 374–379 and accompanying text (elaborating on the 
loser-pay rule).  
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attempt to prevent discovery abuse more directly, as by including 
express limits on the amount of discovery that may be taken.50 
It may be that existing theories can accommodate the 
relatively widespread use of “coarse” procedural clauses. Perhaps 
the benefits of such clauses are more readily apparent ex ante. 
That possibility remains an important area for future research. 
What is clear is that customized adjudication exists, but it does 
not take the form that many have envisioned. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explores the benefits 
that parties can, at least in theory, capture by tailoring 
procedural rules to their liking. Part III then surveys the limited 
evidence, which suggests that customized procedure exists largely 
in the minds of legal scholars. Part III also explores and critiques 
the three prevailing explanations for this apparent disjuncture 
between theory and reality. Part IV presents the findings, 
focusing primarily on clauses that address procedures in binding 
adjudication. However, a variety of contract terms that do not 
meet this definition can influence how parties behave in 
adjudication—for example, by providing information that 
narrows issues or reduces the need for discovery.51 Thus, Part IV 
paints a holistic picture of how commercial contracts address 
dispute resolution, including through non-binding mechanisms. 
Part V concludes by exploring the implications of these findings 
for the literature on customized adjudication. 
II. The Advantages and Types of Customized Procedure 
The debate over customized procedure has produced a rich 
and varied literature.52 Those inclined to embrace party control 
emphasize the benefits of tailored procedural rules,53 while those 
inclined to a more skeptical or agnostic view caution against too-
                                                                                                     
 50. See infra Table 4 (finding most contracts are silent in regard to 
discovery).  
 51. See infra note 239 and accompanying text (explaining how non-binding 
dispute resolution can facilitate agreement over adjudication procedure).  
 52. For a review, see Hoffman, supra note 11, at 397–402 (focusing, 
however, on the literature addressing party control over court proceedings, not 
party control over arbitration).  
 53. See infra Part II.A (explaining these benefits). 
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readily allowing private parties to dictate procedure.54 Most 
participants in this debate take for granted that contracting 
parties in fact exercise their supposed procedural autonomy.55 
But recent studies have cast doubt on this assumption.56 This 
Part summarizes the benefits attributed to customized procedure 
and the prevailing explanations for why parties rarely seem to 
draft their own procedural rules. It does not engage with 
normative objections to party control, which are muted, and 
perhaps absent altogether, if procedural contracting exists only in 
the realm of theory.57 
A. Customized Procedure Can Improve Accuracy, Reduce Drafting 
and Enforcement Costs, and Reveal Information 
One reason parties perform contracts is because of the threat 
of legal enforcement.58 But courts are not perfect, and the 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1342–52 (critiquing prevailing objections to 
customized procedure but cautioning against enforcement of procedural rules 
that interfere with traditional modes of judicial reasoning); Dodge, supra note 8, 
at 786 (proposing to deny enforcement to ex ante procedural bargains that 
impair substantive rights or that alter procedure in ways that would be 
prohibited ex post). See generally Mullenix, supra note 12; Davis & Helen 
Hershkoff, supra note 12; Resnik, supra note 12; Marcus, supra note 12; Dodson, 
supra note 12. 
 55. See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement 
Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1167 (2012) (referring 
to “the systematic customization . . . of procedural mechanisms”); Dodge, supra 
note 8, at 745 (“[S]ophisticated commercial parties regularly modify the rules of 
civil procedure and evidence.”); Mullenix, supra note 12, at 296 (noting the 
“quiet revolution” by which contract terms have displaced “long-standing 
jurisdictional and conflict-of-laws rules”); Marcus, supra note 12, at 974–75 
(referencing the “ubiquity” of customized procedural clauses); Dodson, supra 
note 12, at 3 (noting the “recent trend of customized litigation”); see also Bone, 
supra note 8, at 1342 (emphasizing the scant case law addressing many custom 
procedural clauses). 
 56. See infra Part III.A (reviewing studies finding limited evidence of 
procedural customization).  
 57. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining how the rarity of 
procedural contracting renders this debate premature).  
 58. See Hylton, supra note 7, at 209, 217–20, 223–26 (noting that choice of 
dispute resolution methods can provide deterrence benefits). One should not, of 
course, overstate the importance of contracts, or legal enforcement, to 
commercial relations. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 59 (1963) (famously 
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prospect of error can undermine the incentive to perform.59 Recall 
the example of the contract for the sale of a technologically 
advanced product.60 At the time of the contract, Seller and Buyer 
can anticipate disputes over product quality, and both parties 
have reason to want these disputes resolved accurately. A 
precisely drafted contract would minimize the risk of error,61 but 
Buyer cannot provide specifications in advance, and, in any 
event, the product’s technical complexity may make it hard for a 
non-specialist to tell whether Seller has performed or breached. 
On these assumptions, customized procedure promises improved 
accuracy.62 For example, if the parties believe an arbitrator can 
more accurately detect or remedy breach, they can include an 
arbitration clause in the contract.63 If they prefer litigation but 
question the fact-finding ability of jurors, they might agree to 
waive their right to a jury trial.64 
Customized procedure can do more than increase accuracy.65 
All else equal, parties should prefer to minimize dispute 
resolution costs—for example, by voluntarily exchanging relevant 
information and foregoing unnecessary discovery—and they may 
                                                                                                     
documenting that detailed planning and legal sanctions often play a relatively 
minor role in business relations). 
 59. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 22–23. This is not to say 
that increased accuracy in adjudication is always valuable. See, e.g., Louis 
Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 307, 312–23 (1994) (explaining how the value of accuracy is a 
function of the extent to which parties are informed ex ante). Adjudicator error, 
moreover, is not an either/or proposition, and the relative likelihood of error can 
have complicated incentive effects. See generally Hadfield, supra note 3.  
 60. Supra Part I. 
 61. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21; Scott & Triantis, supra 
note 2, at 822–23. 
 62. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21 (noting how custom 
procedural can increase adjudication accuracy).  
 63. See Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 7, at 550 (“Contracting parties can 
choose, before any disputes arise, whether to resolve all or a subset of their 
disputes in court or through arbitration.”); Brousseau et al., supra note 2, at 
211–12 (discussing dispute resolution mechanisms). 
 64. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 21. 
 65. See Gerhard Wagner, The Dispute Resolution Market, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 
1085, 1118–27 (2014) (identifying both increased accuracy and enforceability of 
judgments, and exploring the trade-off between accuracy and enforcement 
costs).  
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sacrifice some accuracy to attain this goal.66 Once a dispute 
occurs, however, each has an incentive to withhold information 
and exploit discovery devices.67 In our hypothetical sales contract, 
Seller holds most of the information relevant to its efforts to 
perform and may be tempted to withhold unfavorable evidence.68 
For its part, Buyer may try to gain an edge by using discovery 
devices to increase Seller’s litigation costs.69 Lawyers can 
mitigate these tendencies but also exacerbate them.70 Again, 
customized procedure promises a solution. To reduce the risk of 
discovery abuse, the parties might agree to limit their access to 
discovery.71 The literature gives few concrete suggestions for how 
they might do so,72 but one can imagine firm limits on the 
                                                                                                     
 66. See id. (exploring the trade-off between accuracy and enforcement 
costs). 
 67. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 13 (“[A]t the 
post-dispute stage a litigant may exercise her procedural rights to impose risks 
and costs on her counterparty, even though both would have preferred to forgo 
such opportunities at the time of contracting.”); Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, 
at 828–29 (“At the time of the trial, the parties are engaged in splitting a fixed 
gain or loss with little, if any prospective efficiency value.”); Bruce L. Hay, 
Procedural Justice—Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1811–39 (1997) 
(explaining post-dispute incentive structure). 
 68. On the difficulties in securing cooperation between litigants and the 
circumstances in which lawyers and law firms might enable cooperation, see 
Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: 
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 
512 (1994). 
 69. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 16; see also Martin H. 
Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 603 
(2001) (“[T]he bigger the expense to be borne by the opponent, the bigger the 
incentive to make the request.”). 
 70. See, e.g., Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 68, at 511–12 (exploring 
lawyers as potentially aggressive or cooperative agents of a client); see also 
Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance 
Cooperation?: Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 342 (1997) 
(presenting experimental evidence consistent with the claim that lawyers can 
mitigate conflict between litigants); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the 
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 170–73 (1996) (using the 
framing theory of litigation to explore the potential role of lawyers in reducing 
litigation costs).  
 71. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 17–18 (“Litigants 
can lower their costs by cooperatively . . . refraining from discovery abuse . . . .”); 
Dodge, supra note 8 at 746–47 (“[C]ontracts typically limit rather than expand 
discovery, using the shared ex ante preference for minimized litigation costs to 
prevent ex post defection and escalation of resource investment.”). 
 72. Kapeliuk and Klement identify contracts that include discovery 
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number of depositions73 or restrictions on discovery of 
electronically stored information.74 
Customized procedure also allows parties to capture benefits 
during contract formation. This is so for at least two reasons. 
First, parties who trust the adjudicator to reach an accurate 
result may formulate their primary obligations less precisely, 
thereby economizing on drafting costs.75 Assume Seller and 
Buyer expect to arbitrate before an industry expert. Given the 
arbitrator’s familiarity with industry practices, the parties may 
forego elaborate contract drafting and instead simply require 
Seller to use “commercially reasonable efforts.” Second, some 
parties may use customized procedure to send credible 
negotiating signals about reliability, propensity for litigation, or 
other matters.76 For instance, Seller may be a new entrant to a 
market populated by established companies. With no reputation 
for reliability, how can Seller convince Buyer to trust it? 
Conceivably, Seller could signal confidence in its product by 
offering to bear the burden of proof in any lawsuit for breach.77 
                                                                                                     
restrictions in arbitration, but they acknowledge finding no examples of 
contracts that limit discovery in the absence of an arbitration clause. 
Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 10.  
 73. Federal procedural rules allow ten per side, although the court may 
alter this limit. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a). 
 74.  For example, parties might specify ex ante that a particular kind of 
electronically-stored information is not reasonably accessible. FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b)(2)(B). 
 75. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2 at 856–57 (discussing this trade-off 
between front-end and back-end contracting costs). 
 76. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 24–25 (suggesting that 
parties can signal private information by agreeing to custom procedural 
clauses). The insight relates to the familiar contracts literature on default rules, 
much of which has been occupied by the question of whether and when the law 
should adopt defaults designed to promote pre-contractual disclosure. See 
generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Jason Scott Johnston, 
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 
YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, 
The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000). 
 77. Section 2-607(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code assigns to the buyer 
the burden of proving breach with respect to goods accepted. U.C.C. § 2-607(4) 
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977). On the context-dependent incentive 
effects of burden of proof assignments, see generally Scott & Triantis, supra 
note 2, at 860–66. 
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Or, to borrow an example from another context, Daphna Kapeliuk 
and Alon Klement suggest that a prospective tenant might signal 
reliability by agreeing to let the landlord quickly obtain 
provisional relief in the event of a default.78 
Customized procedure offers benefits beyond those noted 
above,79 including greater privacy and confidentiality.80 It bears 
repeating that the literature is concerned with the ability to 
capture these benefits by ex ante agreement.81 Ideally, parties 
would wait for a dispute to arise before negotiating appropriate 
procedures. If no dispute happens, they will save negotiating time 
and expense. If there is a dispute, they will understand its 
parameters and be better positioned to identify cost-effective 
procedures. The problem with deferred negotiations, however, is 
that the parties’ interests diverge ex post.82 At least between 
sophisticated parties, then, courts arguably should be receptive to 
                                                                                                     
 78. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
 79. The magnitude of these benefits will vary by context. For instance, 
parties to international contracts may assign greater value to the ability to 
control procedure. See S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027, 1039–48 (2014). 
 80. Privacy and confidentiality are often cited as benefits of arbitration. See 
Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 318, 318–19 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 
2005). This is not to say that arbitration guarantees confidentiality or that there 
is no public interest in what happens in arbitration. See, e.g., Amy Schmitz, 
Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1211 
(2006) (clarifying the distinction between privacy and confidentiality); Richard 
C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1255, 1257 (2006) (exploring the discoverability and admissibility of 
communications made in arbitration); Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the 
Resolution of Investor-State Disputes-Adoption, Adaptation and NAFTA 
Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2006) (discussing evolution of 
transparency policies in arbitration under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2006) (exploring transparency in 
international commercial arbitration); see also S.I. Strong, Research in 
International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 119, 142–45, 150–56 (2009) (discussing confidentiality of arbitral 
proceedings and awards in international commercial arbitration and explaining 
the relevance of awards and scholarship as sources of law). 
 81. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 16–19 (discussing 
barriers to contracting over procedure ex post).  
 82. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 16–19 (explaining that 
removal of uncertainty post-dispute makes cooperation less likely). 
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ex ante procedural bargains, as it may be difficult for parties to 
agree on optimal procedures once a dispute has arisen.83  
B. The Many (Potential) Forms of Customized Procedure 
Parties rarely need to design a dispute resolution process 
from scratch: 
[C]ourts and arbitration institutions provide bundles of 
services to their customers—in this case, bundles of dispute 
resolution procedures to the parties in a dispute. Courts 
provide the default bundle, but parties can opt instead for 
arbitral procedural bundles that vary according to the 
applicable arbitration rules chosen by the parties.84 
The concept is straightforward. Parties who do not predesignate 
the forum will wind up in court if they have a dispute, and their 
silence constitutes an implicit acceptance of the bundled rules 
applicable in the relevant jurisdiction(s).85 Those who prefer the 
rules of a particular litigation or arbitration forum can agree to 
resolve disputes there.86 If they do not like all of the designated 
                                                                                                     
 83. Changing the Litigation Game, supra note 10, at 1483–84; Wagner, 
supra note 65, at 1101. But see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The 
Problem with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 
485, 526–29 (2003) (critiquing overly sharp distinctions between ex ante and ex 
post agreements over litigation process). A similar barrier may impede ex post 
procedural contracting in consumer and employment relationships. See, e.g., 
Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 
861, 895–96 (2004) (explaining difficulties of agreeing to arbitration ex post); 
Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 559, 
567–68 (2001) (same). Of course, courts more actively regulate such contracts 
under unconscionability and other doctrines. The argument for procedural 
customization assumes that the parties’ bargain is otherwise enforceable. Even 
then, mass consumer and employment contracts may merit different treatment. 
See generally Dodge, supra note 8, at 754–64. 
 84. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1947. 
 85. Without an exclusive forum selection clause, parties cannot be sure of 
the forum in advance. Case-filing decisions are constrained, of course, by rules 
governing jurisdiction and venue and are subject to a host of other rules 
allocating decision-making authority across jurisdictional lines. For example, 
courts faced with duplicative lawsuits often defer to the first-filed action. See, 
e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1102–03 (2d Cir. 
1970) (recognizing the priority afforded to the suit filed first). 
 86. See Dodge, supra note 8, at 739–43 (discussing forum selection); 
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forum’s rules, the parties can tailor them further by drafting 
additional, customized procedures, much like the buyer of an off-
the-rack suit can improve the fit by paying for minor alterations. 
(Of course, parties can design dispute resolution mechanisms 
from scratch, or pay lawyers to do so, just as people can sew their 
own suit or visit bespoke Saville Row tailors.) 
For example, a forum selection clause requiring litigation in 
New York incorporates a bundle of rules that includes (for state 
law causes of action) that state’s conflict of laws rules.87 These 
can be uncertain in application, so the parties might clarify the 
law governing their primary obligations with a choice of law 
clause.88 They might also alter forum rules allocating fact-finding 
duties between judge and jury—say, by waiving the right to a 
jury trial.89 If they deem a subset of disputes more suitable for 
arbitration, they might further add a limited arbitration clause 
designating their preferred arbitration forum for this subset. 
Clauses that send a limited subset of disputes to arbitration are 
sometimes called “carve-ins.”90 
Alternatively, assume that contracting parties want to 
arbitrate most disputes. Rather than draft their own code of 
arbitration procedure, they designate an off-the-rack set of rules, 
such as the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA).91 If the AAA rules are inadequate 
in some respect—for example, by not requiring the arbitrator to 
have relevant industry expertise—the parties can add a clause 
                                                                                                     
Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1–2 (same). This assumes subject 
matter jurisdiction in the case of judicial forums. 
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1971); 
see also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (requiring 
federal courts to apply the conflicts of laws rules of the state where they sit in 
diversity cases). 
 88. See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, What Lawyers Say Determines 
Choice of Law in Merger Agreements:  A Complex Truth (Case Res. Paper Series 
in Legal Stud., Working Paper 2014–10 (rev), 2014) (surveying lawyers 
concerning choice of law in merger agreements). 
 89. The source and content of these rules will depend on whether the 
litigation is in state or federal court. 
 90. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1950 n.23. 
 91. Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. 
ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ 
ADRSTG_004103 (last visited Nov. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Commercial 
Arbitration Rules] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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imposing this requirement.92 The parties also might want to 
litigate a subset of disputes, such as demands for preliminary 
injunctions or other provisional remedies. They can accomplish 
this with a so-called “carve-out” exempting such questions from 
arbitration.93 
Conceptually, it may help to group custom procedural clauses 
according to function. Some designate a preferred set of bundled 
rules for some or all disputes. These include forum selection 
clauses, arbitration clauses that designate an off-the-rack set of 
institutional rules,94 and clauses that specify the governing law.95 
Carve-outs and carve-ins also fall into this group, as these clauses 
designate a forum for a subset of claims or remedies.96 
Other clauses target the adjudicator’s identity, expertise, or 
incentives. Here, parties who expect to litigate have relatively 
little freedom. Courts typically enforce jury trial waivers97 and 
often agree to various non-traditional forms of judicial 
involvement, such as the entry of consent decrees.98 But courts 
                                                                                                     
 92. AAA rules create a process for selecting an arbitrator but do not 
generally require arbitrators to have industry expertise. See id. at 15 (providing 
procedures for appointing an arbitrator in the event the parties cannot agree).  
 93. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1957–59. Here is a carve-
out: “Any dispute, except a dispute involving infringement of Third Party 
intellectual property rights or any intellectual property rights owned or 
controlled by a party, shall be submitted to arbitration . . . .” License, 
Development, Supply, and Distribution Agreement dated Dec. 11, 2006 between 
Immunicon Corporation and Diagnostic Hybrids, Inc. ¶ 14 (Dec. 11, 2006) (on 
file with author). 
 94.  If parties do not specify (or create) procedures to govern the 
arbitration, then the arbitrator will have nearly unfettered discretion to 
determine appropriate procedure. 
 95. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7 (noting 
prevalence of clauses designating the governing law); Noyes, supra note 8, at 
599–601 (discussing forum selection clauses). 
 96. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor refer to carve-outs and carve-ins as 
“unbundled” procedure. Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, Supra note 15, at 1991. 
In a sense this is right, for these clauses exempt claims or remedies from the 
bundled rules that would otherwise apply. Yet, for this subset, carve-outs and 
carve-ins simply replace the default bundle with different bundled rules. I do 
not believe anything turns on the distinction, as Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor 
are interested primarily in whether parties who have designated a forum 
engage in further customization. 
 97. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7; Dodge, supra note 8, at 
747; Bone, supra note 8, at 1348–49. 
 98. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked 
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are public institutions; litigants cannot instruct public officials 
how to act99 or demand a judge with desirable characteristics.100  
Parties who agree to arbitrate have more freedom.101 By 
definition, arbitration involves a private adjudicator selected and 
paid by the parties. Because arbitrators are market actors who 
compete for business, their incentives necessarily differ from 
those of judges.102 Arbitration also differs from litigation in that 
the parties can specify arbitrator characteristics and create 
custom incentive structures. For example, parties can insist on an 
arbitrator with industry expertise.103 They can require a three-
arbitrator panel, thereby forcing each member not only to reach a 
decision but to persuade at least one other panelist.104 Parties can 
                                                                                                     
Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1207–
20 (2000) (exploring judicial treatment of consent decrees). 
 99. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE. L.J. 1073, 
1085 (1984) (noting that judges do not derive their authority from private 
contractual agreements). 
 100. Judges on a court may share attributes or follow consistent case-
management practices. If these differ across jurisdictions, a forum selection 
clause allows parties (indirectly) to select between judicial models. But parties 
still cannot specify the judge’s background or easily adjust the judge’s 
incentives. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 29–34 (explaining 
that the incentives facing judges are shaped by institutional mandates and not 
market pressures). Arbitration offers much greater flexibility. See, e.g., 
Distribution Agreement dated Aug. 12, 2009 between MaxLinear, Inc. and 
Lestina, Int’l Ltd., at ¶ 15.8 (“The arbitrator will have at least 15 years of 
appropriate experience in the semiconductor industry and be independent of the 
parties.”) (on file with author). 
 101. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1386 (discussing the wide latitude parties 
have in shaping the arbitration process). 
 102. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitration and the Negotiation Process, 77 
AM. ECON. REV., May 1987, at 343 (suggesting that a successful arbitrator must 
“provide decisions that are forecasts of the decisions other arbitrators will make 
in similar situations”). This is not to say that judges do not try to accommodate 
lawyers who make case-filing decisions or otherwise behave as if competing for 
business, only that judges are insulated from market forces to a greater extent 
than arbitrators. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices 
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 4–7 
(1993) (exploring the incentive structure of federal judges). 
 103. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that parties 
may choose expert arbitrators when disputes require scientific or technical 
expertise).  
 104. On panel dynamics in arbitration, see, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk, Collegial 
Games: Analyzing the Effect of Panel Composition on Outcome in Investment 
Arbitration, 31 REV. LITIG. 267, 292–97 (2012) (focusing on investment 
arbitration); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 
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even dictate the method of reaching a decision. For example, in 
“final offer arbitration”—sometimes called “baseball arbitration” 
due to its association with salary disputes in professional 
baseball—the arbitrator must choose between resolutions proposed 
by the parties.105 
Other clauses directly alter litigation costs and payouts. 
Examples include clauses that allocate responsibility for attorney 
fees,106 litigation costs, and arbitration-specific costs such as 
administrative fees, facility rental charges, and arbitrator 
compensation.107 Finally, some clauses specify the manner and 
timing of initiating a claim, the rules of discovery and other pre-
trial processes, and the rules of procedure and evidence at trial (or 
the merits hearing in arbitration).108 Examples include clauses 
that reduce or expand the time for filing claims,109 establish a 
method for serving process,110 specify alternate pleading 
standards,111 restrict or expand discovery,112 allocate burdens of 
                                                                                                     
485, 497–98 (1997) (discussing the process of compromise resulting from party-
appointed arbitrators on a three-arbitrator panel—at least where party 
appointees are not required to be neutral). 
 105. See, e.g., Michael Carrell & Richard Bales, Considering Final Offer 
Arbitration to Resolve Public Sector Impasses in Times of Concession 
Bargaining, 28 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 17–22 (2013) (discussing salary 
arbitration in Major League Baseball). 
 106. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing 
symmetric and asymmetric approaches to allocating attorney fees); Dodge, 
supra note 8, at 748 (same).  
 107. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee 
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729, 736–42 (2006) (discussing the AAA’s fee 
structure). 
 108. Again, and in keeping with the literature, I use the term “procedural” 
to refer to a wide range of clauses that alter traditional rules governing 
litigation.  
 109. See Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7 (describing how 
parties can waive statute of limitations defenses); Dodge, supra note 8, at 746. 
(same). 
 110. Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 7.  
 111. See, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around 
Twombly, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2010) (exploring the possibility that contracting 
parties might adopt the pre-Twombly pleading standard). 
 112. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 10, at 469–72 (exploring customized 
discovery procedures); Dodge, supra note 8, at 746–47 (same); Bone, supra note 
8, at 1346–47 (same); Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 17–18 
(same).  
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proof,113 or adjust evidentiary rules.114 For instance, parties might 
agree to waive hearsay objections115 or objections as to the 
authenticity of a document.116 Clauses in this category tend to 
modify rules that are procedural in the classic, trans-substantive 
sense.117 
These categories are stylized and overlapping, but they 
usefully highlight the central function of each clause. For 
example, parties who agree to arbitrate may expect this choice to 
reduce the expense of discovery118 and to do away with the 
hearsay rule.119 However, the decision to arbitrate may or may 
not produce these incidental benefits.120 Likewise, parties who 
agree to a loser-pays rule with respect to attorney fees may 
expect this to reduce discovery costs, but this may not prove true 
in all cases. The categories emphasize the functions necessarily 
accomplished by each clause. 
  
                                                                                                     
 113. Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 857–58, n.129. 
 114. Bone, supra note 8, at 1349; Noyes, supra note 8, at 607–08; Moffitt, 
supra note 10, at 472–75. 
 115. Noyes, supra note 8, at 607–08. 
 116. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 417 (discussing self-authenticating 
contracts). 
 117. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (noting rarity of clauses 
modifying procedural rules). 
 118. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1953–54.  
 119. The presumption is that the rules of evidence do not apply in 
arbitration, although institutional rules often leave this to the arbitrator’s 
discretion. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 91, at 23 
(“Conformity to the legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary.”). 
 120. See id. (“The arbitrator shall determine the admissibility, relevance, 
and materiality of the evidence offered.”). 
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Table 1. Categories of Customized Procedure, 
by Function, with Examples 
     1. Selects Bundled Rules 
• Forum Selection 
• Arbitration 
• Choice of Law 
• Carve-out 
• Carve-in 
     2. Adjusts Adjudicator Identity and Incentives 
• Jury Trial Waiver 
• Arbitrator Expertise 
• Arbitrator Number 
• Decision Method (e.g., Final Offer Arbitration) 
     3. Alters Adjudication Costs/Payouts 
• Allocates Attorney Fees 
• Allocates Litigation or Arbitration Costs 
     4. Addresses Timing, Procedure, or Evidence 
• Alters Statute of Limitations 
• Specifies Pleading Standard 
• Allocates Burden of Proof 
• Service of Process Method 
• Restricts or Expands Discovery 
• Alters Evidentiary Rules 
III. Why Don’t Parties Exercise Their Procedural Freedom? 
The discussion thus far has emphasized the benefits 
attributed to customized procedure. As noted, however, many 
view with skepticism the prospect that parties might dictate 
adjudication procedure.121 This is especially so for mass consumer 
and employment contracts, which present the risk that 
businesses will draft one-sided procedures that effectively bestow 
immunity from liability.122 But skepticism about customized 
                                                                                                     
 121. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (noting skeptical views about 
party-controlled procedure). 
 122. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 8 at 757–64 (emphasizing information 
asymmetries and other bargaining defects in form contracts with individuals); 
Moffitt, supra note 10, at 517–18 (expressing similar concerns). A voluminous 
literature critically examines party control over the arbitration process. 
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procedure also extends to arms-length contracts between 
commercial parties.123 At the extreme, some argue, party control 
over litigation procedure may “create[] risks to the institution of 
adjudication itself.”124 For present purposes, however, normative 
questions about customized procedure must take a back seat to 
descriptive ones. There is a consensus that customized procedure 
is widespread.125 But the limited available evidence suggests that 
this is not so.126 As David Hoffman notes, the “grand cathedral of 
privatized civil procedure” may have a flimsy foundation in 
fact.127 
A. The Limited Evidence of Procedural Customization 
Most contracts are private documents.128 Researchers 
interested in contract terms therefore tend to rely on a limited 
number of publicly available contracts repositories, including 
                                                                                                     
Examples include David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 460–68 (2011); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It 
Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1640–42 (2005) (identifying problems with the 
manner in which many consumer and employment arbitration agreements are 
formed and with the terms of the resulting arbitration process). 
 123. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 8, at 1362–68 (discounting many common 
objections to party control); Dodge, supra note 8, at 754–63 (exploring separately 
procedural autonomy in commercial and consumer contracts); Mullenix, supra 
note 12, at 339–47 (objecting to elevating contract rules over jurisdictional and 
other principles); Moffitt, supra note 10, at 513–19 (exploring objections to 
customized litigation). For a related inquiry into the normative questions raised 
by party control over judicial procedures, see generally Cole, supra note 98 
(discussing managerial litigants who demand non-traditional forms of judicial 
involvement). 
 124. Bone, supra note 8, at 1398. The concern is that radical departures 
from normal judicial processes might compromise the commitment of judges to 
traditional forms of judicial reasoning. On other normative objections to party 
control, see infra Part V. 
 125. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 392–93 (stating the common perception 
that customized procedure “is on the verge of being ‘systematic’”). 
 126. See id. at 393–94 (noting there is little evidence of widespread 
procedural customization). 
 127. Id. at 394. 
 128.  There is nevertheless a growing empirical literature studying 
contracts, how they are produced, and how they are viewed and implemented by 
parties. For a literature review, see generally Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of 
Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 291 (2012). 
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material contracts included with Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)129 and franchise agreements filed with state 
regulators.130 
Despite these limits, the evidence suggests that even 
sophisticated commercial actors rarely customize the 
adjudication process in any detail. Some clauses are relatively 
common. Most notably, several studies document near-
ubiquitous use of choice of law clauses, although these studies 
tend to involve merger agreements—high-value transactions in 
which lawyers are particularly attentive to the governing law.131 
Other studies find forum selection clauses in at least a 
substantial minority of contracts.132 The same is true for 
                                                                                                     
 129. See, e.g., Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1972 (compiling a 
sample of a variety of contracts filed with the SEC); Hoffman, supra note 11, at 
403–16 (same); Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Employment 
Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 136–37 (2012) (studying CEO employment 
contracts); Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use 
(or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 449–67 
(2010) (analyzing material contracts filed with the SEC); Theodore Eisenberg & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante 
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 335 (2007) [hereinafter The Flight from Arbitration] (same); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical 
Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 983–94 (2006) 
[hereinafter, Ex Ante Choices] (analyzing merger agreements filed with the 
SEC). 
 130. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” 
Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and 
Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 987–1011 (2014); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 7, 
at 550. Other studies use survey methods to identify contracting practices. See, 
e.g., Brousseau et al., supra note 2 (2007). Additional studies focus on credit 
card agreements or other consumer contracts, but these are outside the scope of 
this project. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration 
Clauses in Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 536, 539 (2012). 
 131. See, e.g., Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129, at 1987 tbl.2 (all merger 
agreements in sample designate governing law); Matthew D. Cain & Stephen M. 
Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 92, 105 
Panel C (2012) (same); see also Hoffman, supra note 11, at 410 (finding over 
1,000 contracts each year in text-based search of SEC material contracts); Giles 
Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts (University of Luxembourg 
Law Working Paper No. 2014-12, 2014) (studying commercial contracts used by 
parties to ICC arbitrations and finding that over 80% of contracts included a 
choice of law clause).  
 132. See, e.g., Cain & Davidoff, supra note 131, at 105, Panel C (2012) 
(finding that 87.3% of a sample of merger agreements included forum selection 
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arbitration clauses,133 many of which include “carve-outs” allowing 
the parties to go to court to litigate a subset of claims, such as 
requests for preliminary injunctive relief.134 Finally—although the 
evidence is scant here—recent studies suggest that commercial 
contracts often adopt a loser-pays rule regarding attorney fees135 
                                                                                                     
clause); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An 
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held 
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1504 tbl.11 (2009) [hereinafter, 
The Flight to NY] (finding that 38.9% of a sample of commercial contracts 
included choice of forum clause); Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129, at 1987 
(finding that 52.5% of a sample of merger agreements included choice of forum 
clause); see also Hoffman, supra note 11, at 407–08 (concluding based on text 
search of SEC filings that “a plurality of contracts choose forum”). 
 133. See, e.g., O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 161 tbl.1 (2012) 
(finding that 51.5% of a sample of CEO employment contracts required 
arbitration of some or all disputes); Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 
1973 (finding that 47.5% of a sample of technology contracts included an 
arbitration clause, again with substantial variation across contract type); 
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 465–66 tbl.4 (reporting arbitration usage 
of 47.6% and 71%, respectively, in domestic and international joint venture 
agreements); Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 7, at 566 (reporting that 34 of 75 
franchisors included arbitration clauses in their contracts); Drahozal & 
Rutledge, supra note 130, at 29–32 (finding more widespread use of arbitration 
in two samples of franchise contracts—e.g., in a sample of agreements filed by 
68 franchisors between 1999 and 2013, arbitration clauses appeared between 
39.7% and 45.6% of the time); Brousseau et al., supra note 2, at 218 (finding 
that 62% of a sample of technology licensing agreements implement an 
alternative dispute mechanism, primarily arbitration). Eisenberg and Miller 
find much lower rates of arbitration overall; only around 11% of their sample of 
commercial contracts included an arbitration clause. See The Flight From 
Arbitration, supra note 129, at 351 tbl.2. For a variety of reasons, however, their 
sample may understate the prevalence of arbitration clauses. See Drahozal & 
Ware, supra note 129, at 449–67 (noting that Eisenberg and Miller did not 
sample joint venture agreements, which are contracts more likely to contain 
arbitration agreements).  
 134. For example, O’Hara O’Connor et al. found such carve-outs in nearly 
half of a sample of CEO employment contracts. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra 
note 129, at 167–68. Likewise, Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor found routine use 
of carve-outs in arbitration clauses in samples of joint venture, technology, and 
franchise agreements. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 21–31; see also 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from 
Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 113–15 (2008) (finding frequent use of 
carve outs in franchise agreements). 
 135. Under the default rule—the so-called “American rule”—each side pays 
its own lawyer’s fees. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of 
Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982). The 
so-called “English rule” requires the losing party to pay the winner’s reasonable 
attorney fees. Eisenberg and Miller find no preference between the rules in a 
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and (much more rarely) agree to waive the right to a jury 
trial.136 
This brief summary obscures a great deal of variance across 
different types of commercial contract (e.g., domestic or 
international). For example, arbitration clauses appear more 
frequently when the contract involves an international 
transaction.137 The prevalence of jury trial waivers likewise 
varies dramatically across contract type.138 Nevertheless, the 
broad patterns are clear. Except for the clauses listed above, 
commercial contracts rarely include custom procedural clauses.139 
For example, in a study of arbitration clauses in CEO 
employment contracts, O’Hara O’Connor et al. found that most 
contracts selected a set of institutional arbitration rules and 
addressed the question of arbitration costs.140 But relatively few 
contracts—typically between 1–10%—addressed aspects of the 
arbitration, such as discovery rights, the availability of punitive 
                                                                                                     
large sample of commercial contracts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical 
Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 350–52 (2013) 
(finding that 37.1% of the contracts in their sample adopted the American rule, 
while 36.4% adopted the English rule). Because they include contracts that do 
not mention attorney fees in their count of contracts that adopt the default 
American rule, it is not clear what proportion of contracts in their sample 
expressly addresses the subject of attorney fees. Nevertheless, their data make 
clear that it is at least a substantial minority, and probably a clear majority.  
 136. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value?: 
Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large 
Corporate Contracts, (2006) CORNELL L. FAC. PUBL’NS paper 67, at 3 (finding that 
only about 20% of 2,800 commercial contracts contained jury trial waivers, 
although also finding substantial variance across contract type, ranging from 
1.9% to 64.5%).  
 137. See, e.g., The Flight From Arbitration, supra note 129, at 350–53 
(finding that arbitration clauses appear nearly twice as often when the contract 
includes an international party). 
 138. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 136, at 17 tbl.2 (contrasting the low 
prevalence of jury trial waivers in employment and bond indenture contracts 
with the high prevalence of jury trial waivers in credit commitments and 
security agreements). 
 139. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 137 (noting that, beyond 
basic clauses determining the governing rules and arbitration association, 
customization is relatively rare).   
 140. See id. at 162–66 (finding that over half of the CEO employment 
contracts in the sample expressly allocated arbitration costs). 
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damages, or the right to appeal the arbitrator’s award.141 
Likewise, using broad text searches of material contracts filed 
with the SEC, David Hoffman looked for evidence of procedural 
customization, focusing on contracts without arbitration 
clauses.142 Except for the relatively common clauses noted above, 
he found little evidence of customized procedure.143 In his 
estimate, for example, clauses allocating the burden of proof 
appear in no more than 1–2% of contracts in the EDGAR 
database.144 
These should be understood as preliminary, tentative 
findings. The number of relevant studies is quite small, and most 
report the prevalence of only one or two custom terms. As 
described below, moreover, the studies are subject to a variety of 
methodological limits.145 Nevertheless, the apparent rarity of 
customized procedure has shifted the terms of debate. The 
important question, it seems, is why sophisticated commercial 
actors do not exploit their freedom to adjust procedural rules. 
What explains the disjuncture between the theory and the 
(apparent) reality of customized procedure?  
B. Efforts to Explain the Rarity of Customized Procedure 
The theoretical and empirical study of contract innovation is 
a relatively new field.146 Even when limited to commercial 
transactions between sophisticated actors—and ignoring the 
definitional questions associated with these terms—the story of 
how contracts are produced and evolve is a complex one. The 
                                                                                                     
 141. Id. at 166–67 tbl.5. 
 142. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 395 (noting the analytical difference 
between dictating judicial procedures and opting out of litigation altogether). 
 143. See id. (summarizing findings). 
 144. Id. at 420. 
 145. See infra Part III.C (discussing methodological limits).  
 146. For just a few recent examples of the genre, see generally Stephen J. 
Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2013); Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 83 (2013); Barak Richman, Contracts Meet Henry Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
77 (2011); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default 
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of 
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). 
CUSTOMIZED PROCEDURE 1893 
nature of the transaction; the identity, resources, and expertise of 
the parties and their agents; the background legal regime—these 
and other factors will shape the process of contract production.147 
Thus, explanations for the seeming rarity of customized 
procedure are tentative and varied.148 Three accounts are 
especially prominent. 
1. Negative Signaling 
One possibility is that bargaining over adjudication 
procedures sends a negative signal about the bargaining party’s 
ability to perform or propensity for litigation.149 In our 
hypothetical technology sale, assume Seller’s past experience 
with litigation has made it concerned about discovery costs. It 
would prefer a contract that limits access to discovery and would 
accept, if necessary, a somewhat lower price in exchange for the 
restriction. But Buyer might misinterpret Seller’s request for a 
discovery limitation as a sign that Seller doubts its ability to 
perform. This risk may deter Seller from making the request.150 
The negative signaling account thus posits that parties avoid 
bargaining over the rules of adjudication because they do not 
                                                                                                     
 147. For a recent summary of some of the relevant literature, see John F. 
Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 133, 138–44 (2014) (discussing the obstacles and conditions 
conducive to innovation in contract formation). 
 148. See id. at 139 (identifying factors that hamper contractual innovation).   
 149. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 136, at 122 (“[B]usiness parties may 
be reluctant to demand arbitration because the demand might be taken as 
signaling a propensity to breach.”); cf. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 130, at 
20 (noting that signaling may deter change to dispute resolution provisions); 
Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
87, 119 (1995) (“[B]ringing up dispute resolution procedures when negotiating a 
contract may be a signal . . . of the likelihood that a claim will arise through 
breach of contract.”). 
 150. See generally Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 
RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992) (modeling how signaling concerns may deter parties 
from proposing surplus-maximizing terms); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic 
Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 
615 (1990) (explaining how signaling concerns may leave parties stuck with an 
inefficient default); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in 
a Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 754 (2006) (noting that 
concerns over signaling may deter parties from contracting over required levels 
of investment). 
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want to signal they are likely to breach or to sue. What 
hypotheses follow from this account? One possibility is that 
contracts will not address dispute resolution at all—i.e., will 
simply accept the default rules. But this need not be the case. 
Transactional lawyers begin not with a blank sheet of paper but 
with a form: the contract used in a prior deal.151 They then 
modify this template to suit the present transaction.152 Standard 
dispute resolution clauses, such as forum selection and 
arbitration clauses, may be incorporated into contract boilerplate 
and spread throughout the market even if parties do not 
explicitly bargain over them. For example, a large firm with 
market power can insist on a custom procedural clause without 
worrying about sending a negative signal; it is in a position to 
dictate terms.153 Likewise, a prominent law firm might introduce 
a change into the template it offers its many clients.154 If adopted 
                                                                                                     
 151. See Choi et al., supra note 146, at 2–3 (describing the majority of 
contracts as “modifications of existing templates”). 
 152. James C. Freund’s Anatomy of a Merger offers an amusing 
(hypothetical) example in which a senior partner chastises a junior lawyer for 
starting with the final contract from a prior transaction, thereby incorporating a 
variety of concessions extracted by the other party after fierce bargaining. See 
James. C. Freund, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR 
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 500–01 (1975). 
 153. This is one explanation for the apparently greater use of custom 
procedural clauses in contracts of adhesion. Cf. Unbundling Procedure, supra 
note 15, at 1991–92 (also noting that drafters can spread costs over many 
contracts). 
 154. For analogous findings from the corporate and sovereign debt markets, 
see Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 
753–60 (1997) (finding that underwriters played a role in disseminating new 
corporate debt terms); Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate 
Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Debt Contracts, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 929, 971–76 (2004) (making a similar finding for high volume law firms). 
Other actors can prompt changes to contract templates, including non-profits, 
trade associations, and academics. See Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 112–22 (2013) (discussing possible sources of contractual 
innovation). In some contexts, moreover, small firms without a vested interest 
in the status quo may also introduce changes, although these are not likely to 
spread as widely. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Robert E. Scott, & Mitu 
Gulati, Contracts, Origin Myths, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 78 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 72 (2013); Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Innovation After the 
Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond Changes Since 2003, 4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 85 
(2009); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 50–
53 (2009); cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change 
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by other parties, these templates may spread through the 
market.  
Thus, the most plausible prediction of the negative signaling 
account is that dispute resolution clauses will exhibit low 
variance, both across and within firms. There will be a relatively 
small number of standard clauses in the market, but few 
contracts will exhibit signs of individualized bargaining over 
procedural rules.155 In a given transaction, the choice among 
these standard templates will be determined largely by the party 
that provides the drafting template for the deal.156 Individual 
firms, moreover, will typically use the same clause, although 
firms with substantial bargaining power may occasionally amend 
their preferred template.157  
2. Contracts and the Product Innovation Cycle 
A second possibility draws on literature likening contracts to 
products, where innovation often occurs in punctuated bursts.158 
Change occurs incrementally until some technological advance or 
exogenous shock disrupts the status quo.159 To use an example 
from the cement industry, from approximately 1910 to 1960, the 
production capacity of cement kilns improved only 
incrementally.160 Then, in the 1960s, computers transformed the 
                                                                                                     
and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 
244 (2013) (studying end user license agreements and finding greater 
innovation by younger, growing, large firms, and firms with legal departments). 
 155. For the reasons discussed in the text, the relatively common use of 
custom terms such as carve-outs, see Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 
1991, does not necessarily undercut negative signaling theory. Contract terms 
can spread throughout a market, even without explicit bargaining. 
 156. See supra notes 151–154 and accompanying text (discussing the 
significance of contract boilerplate). 
 157. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (noting that firms with 
market power may dictate terms). 
 158. See, e.g., Tushman & Anderson, supra note 36, at 460 (discussing 
patterns of technological change in a number of markets). For extensions of this 
literature into the field of commercial contracts, see generally Choi et al., supra 
note 146; Richman, supra note 146. 
 159. See Tushman & Anderson, supra note 36, at 440–44 (examining 
patterns of technological change). 
 160. See id. at 452 fig.1a (showing production capacity). 
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industry by allowing the construction of enormous, computer-
controlled kilns with radically increased capacity.161 To compete, 
existing producers had to invest in the new technology.162 Similar 
patterns of innovation have been observed in mass-produced, 
tradable contracts such as securities. Examining sovereign bonds, 
for instance, Choi et al. demonstrate a broad shift in the contract 
template in the wake of financial crises.163 In prior work, I 
document a similar shift after the United States and United 
Kingdom enacted statutes that enhanced the ability of private 
creditors to sue foreign governments.164 
Extending this literature, David Hoffman argues that 
procedural tailoring will not become widespread until a shock 
disrupts entrenched contracting practices.165 He suggests that a 
few relatively minor players, such as new market entrants, might 
adopt atypical procedural clauses, but that these will not become 
“a normal part of the transactional toolkit” until such a shock 
occurs.166 As an example of a sufficiently disruptive event, he 
proposes that a high-profile court decision approving use of a rare 
procedural clause might prompt widespread use of the clause.167 
                                                                                                     
 161. See id. at 451–52 (explaining how technology transformed the 
industry).  
 162. See id. at 450–52 (noting that leading firms benefited from the shift but 
that large new investments were required); see also William J. Abernathy & 
Kim B. Clark, Innovation: Mapping the Winds of Creative Destruction, 14 RES. 
POL’Y 3, 12–13 (1985) (discussing the impact of the development of the closed 
steel auto body). 
 163. See Choi et al., supra note 146, at 17, 20–27, 31–35 (documenting 
changes in the sovereign bond template).  
 164. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and 
Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 69 (2014) (exploring the impact on 
sovereign bonds of changes in the law of foreign sovereign immunity). 
 165. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 425–29 (analyzing the lifecycle of 
contract innovation). 
 166. Id. at 427. The prediction that minor players will experiment first is 
based on the insight that “marginal players believe that they can best compete 
with established players by innovating, while established players have no 
reason to risk negative outcomes from contractual innovation if they can rely on 
returning customers or their reputation for satisfactory legal work.” Choi et al., 
supra note 146, at 8–9. See generally Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 154 
(presenting evidence of innovation by minor players); Weidemaier, supra note 
154 (same). 
 167. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 428–29 (“What would such shocks look 
like? A Supreme Court decision making terms salient—and explicitly approving 
their enforceability—would be exemplary.”); see also Rutledge & Drahozal, 
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Hoffman’s core prediction is that new procedural clauses will 
not become widespread until after a highly salient, disruptive 
event.168 The most direct way to refute this hypothesis would be 
to identify clauses that gained wide acceptance without such a 
shift. None of the clauses coded for this Article meet that 
description.169 Nevertheless, there are other reasons—explored 
more fully below—to question how closely this model captures the 
process of innovation in commercial contracts.170 
3. Procedural Contracting Is Too Costly 
Chris Drahozal and Erin O’Hara O’Connor offer an 
alternative explanation. They suggest that parties can capture 
many of the benefits of customized procedure by making an 
initial choice of arbitration or litigation, selecting the jurisdiction 
or arbitration provider that offers the most desirable bundle of 
procedures.171 By hypothesis, parties will choose the forum and 
rules that offer the greatest net benefit across all future 
disputes.172 If the designated forum is not suitable for some 
claims or remedies, parties can use carve-outs or carve-ins to 
select a more appropriate set of bundled rules for this subset.173 
Recall that a carve-out allows parties who have chosen 
                                                                                                     
supra note 130, at 955 (finding a modest increase in the use of class action 
waivers in franchise agreements after the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)). 
 168. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 427–28 (arguing that change is 
responsive to exogenous shocks, “not the slow accretion of precedent”). 
 169. See infra note 357 and accompanying text (leaving open the possibility 
that a salient shock could prompt adoption of new procedural clauses). 
 170. See infra notes 174–182 and accompanying text (questioning the 
contract-as-product model as applied to commercial contracts). 
 171. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1949–50 (noting that 
studies show a “surprisingly little use of customized procedural rules in 
contracts between sophisticated parties”). 
 172. See id. at 1954 (making this assumption); see also Hylton, supra note 7, 
at 218 (emphasizing potential deterrence benefits of adjudication). These 
benefits are offset by dispute resolution costs in the designated forum and, in 
the case of arbitration, by the need to identify and draft an appropriate 
arbitration clause. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1954–55 
(discussing these costs). 
 173. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1955–61 (discussing 
carve-outs and carve-ins). 
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arbitration as the default method of dispute resolution to send a 
subset of disputes to litigation; with a carve-in, parties who will 
litigate most disputes send a subset to arbitration. 
Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor argue that, having made 
such a choice, parties will often find it prohibitively costly to 
engage in further customization.174 To make this argument 
concrete, assume that Seller and Buyer agree to the following 
arbitration clause, which is based on a model promulgated by the 
AAA: 
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration 
administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) 
in accordance with its Commercial Arbitration Rules. Either 
party also may, without waiving any remedy under this 
agreement, seek a temporary restraining order and/or a 
preliminary injunction from any court having jurisdiction, to 
preserve the rights or property of that party pending the 
institution of the arbitration process or the deliberation and 
award of the arbitrator(s).175 
Arbitration has certain intrinsic characteristics that 
distinguish it from litigation.176 The list can be debated,177 but the 
                                                                                                     
 174. See id. at 1963–65 (emphasizing the difficulty of identifying procedures 
appropriate for all potential disputes). This is familiar terrain for the economic 
analysis of contracts, which recognizes that contracts are necessarily 
incomplete. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in 
HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 41, 46 (Claude Ménard & Mary M. 
Shirley eds., 2005); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After 
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 846 (2003). One reason 
for incompleteness is that some subjects are noncontractible, meaning “the 
direct costs of drafting an effective state-contingent contract plus the cost of 
error would be prohibitive.” Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of 
Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 785 (2006). Drahozal and 
O’Hara O’Connor argue that this is true for many custom procedural rules. 
 175. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESOLUTION CLAUSES: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE at 10 (2013). The first sentence of this clause is a modified 
version of the AAA’s model arbitration clause for commercial disputes. See id. 
(providing examples of arbitration clauses). The second sentence includes a 
carve-out for claims seeking preliminary injunctive relief. Id.  
 176. On the choice between litigation and arbitration, see Hylton, supra note 
7, at 213 (discussing the considerations that influence this choice); Bruce L. 
Benson, To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That is the Question, 8 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 91 
(1999) (discussing potential benefits of arbitration); Steven Shavell, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–9 (1995) 
(same). 
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primary distinction is that the arbitrator is the parties’ agent, not 
a public servant,178 and operates subject to market constraints.179 
Many parties also expect arbitration to involve less extensive 
discovery.180 By hypothesis, then, Seller and Buyer choose 
arbitration over litigation because they expect this choice to yield 
more accurate results and fewer opportunities for discovery 
abuse.181 They designate their preferred arbitration provider and 
rule set from among a variety of market choices.182 They also use 
a carve-out to preserve the right to go to court when a party seeks 
temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, which may be difficult 
to obtain in arbitration.183 
                                                                                                     
 177.  For a more complete discussion of the advantages and limitation of 
arbitration, see 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §§ 3.1–3.2.9 
(1999). 
 178.  See, e.g., George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580–
81 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing the arbitrator as the parties’ agent); Paul F. 
Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its Implications for Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 26–31 (2006) (discussing the 
contractarian model of arbitration); see also Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator As 
Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1013, 1018–19 (2010) (noting limits on the ability of arbitrators to act as pure 
agents for the parties). 
 179. See Ashenfelter, supra note 102, at 342–46 (discussing how market 
forces influence arbitrators).  
 180. See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 7, at 24 (presenting survey data 
on the reasons for embracing alternative dispute resolution methods). 
Arbitration also offers somewhat greater privacy and confidentiality than 
litigation in public courts. Again, this expectation is not absolute. On privacy 
and confidentiality in arbitration, see generally Cole & Blankley, supra note 80, 
at 318–19; Schmitz, supra note 80; Reuben, supra note 80. In exchange for these 
benefits, parties to an arbitration agreement give up the procedural protections 
of litigation, including judicial review. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (providing 
limited grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. 
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589–90 (2008) (determining that, under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, parties cannot contract for de novo judicial review). 
 181. In Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor’s terms, parties will choose to 
arbitrate when the deterrence benefits of arbitration (net of dispute resolution 
costs and specification costs—i.e., the cost of identifying and drafting an 
appropriate arbitration clause) exceed the deterrence benefits of litigation (net 
of litigation costs). Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1955. 
 182. The AAA provides administrative services (roughly akin to those 
provided by the clerk of court) and not simply rules. See generally 3 IAN R. 
MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
LAW § 26.2.3 (1994) (discussing administered arbitration). 
 183. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 456–57 (noting that courts 
have the ability to provide immediate injunctive relief while arbitration must 
1900 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015) 
Having allocated claims and remedies to the forum with the 
most appropriate bundled rules, the parties may find that 
additional tailoring is not worth the trouble. For example, a 
clause requiring an arbitrator to have industry expertise will 
increase dispute resolution costs across the board (experts charge 
more) but will only sometimes increase accuracy.184 Likewise, a 
firm discovery limit might prove appropriate in some cases but 
deny the adjudicator needed procedural flexibility in others.185 
The specification costs associated with identifying and drafting a 
clause that offers net benefits across all foreseeable states might 
exceed any potential benefits.186 Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor 
remain somewhat agnostic, but their analysis suggests that, 
except for carve-outs and (perhaps) carve-ins, specification costs 
will be prohibitive for most procedural modifications.187 
Reviewing evidence from a variety of commercial contexts, they 
show that parties who agree to arbitrate routinely use carve-
outs,188 but they find no evidence supporting the routine use of 
carve-ins.189  
C. The Limits of These Explanations 
As suggested above, each of these explanations has limits. 
The signaling explanation, for example, is hard to square with 
                                                                                                     
wait until an arbitrator is appointed). 
 184. For example, if the parties disagreed about whether Seller designed the 
product in accordance with industry standards, they might prefer an expert. 
Otherwise, they might have to put on expensive evidentiary presentations to 
educate the non-expert about industry practices and requirements. On the other 
hand, many disputes would not require industry expertise, and in these 
disputes, an expert adjudicator would only increase costs. 
 185. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1963–64 (noting that ex 
ante specification may deny the arbitrator valuable flexibility to tailor 
discovery). 
 186. See id. at 1964 (“[T]he cost of anticipating the universe of possible 
disputes and ensuring that the customization provides a net benefit to the 
parties could be quite significant.”). 
 187. See id. at 1989–92 (arguing that the lack of specialization in contracts 
between sophisticated parties may be the result of prohibitive costs). 
 188. See id. at 1966–87 (analyzing contracts across industries). 
 189. Id. at 1949 n.18. By contrast, I find relatively frequent use of carve-ins. 
See infra Table 4 (noting that 19%—35 of 184—of contracts that do not provide 
for arbitration as the default nevertheless include a carve-in). 
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the fact that parties frequently do contract over dispute 
resolution procedures.190 Although not widespread, arbitration 
clauses, forum selection clauses, attorney fee-shifting clauses, 
and even jury trial waivers appear with some frequency in 
commercial contracts.191 What is needed is a plausible 
explanation for why parties who are already contracting over 
such matters do not also address other aspects of the adjudication 
process.  
One possibility—consistent with the signaling account—
invokes the power of standard contract templates.192 As I have 
explained, it is possible for a contract term to enter widespread 
use even though it is rarely the subject of negotiations.193 A 
clause introduced by a high-volume law firm—say, an arbitration 
clause—might spread relatively unnoticed through the market.194 
Contracting parties might then hesitate to change or augment 
this clause for fear of signaling an increased likelihood of a 
dispute.195 In other words, relatively invariant contracting 
practices—such as widespread use of a relatively small number of 
standard dispute resolution templates—would be consistent with 
the signaling account. By contrast, if contracts address dispute 
resolution in varied ways that suggest active negotiation, then we 
may have to look elsewhere to explain the infrequent use of many 
custom terms. Unfortunately, studies rarely examine contracting 
practices in this manner, leaving the signaling account relatively 
unexplored. 
The contract-as-product model raises an additional, more 
fundamental question. It is not clear how closely this model 
corresponds to the way in which most commercial contracts are 
produced. Contracts often share certain features of mass-
                                                                                                     
 190. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing negative signaling). 
 191. See supra Part III.A (discussing evidence of procedural customization). 
 192. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing how firms with 
substantial market power influence standard contract templates). 
 193. See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text (discussing the 
diffusion of standard terms). 
 194. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing how law firms 
can disseminate contract terms). 
 195. Cf. Gertner & Miller, supra note 149, at 119 (“[B]ringing up dispute 
resolution procedures when negotiating a contract might be a signal, not of the 
value of the ultimate claim, but of the likelihood that a claim will arise through 
breach of contract.”). 
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produced goods.196 Like other producers, law firms and corporate 
counsel engage in many similar transactions and develop 
routines to ensure the predictable and efficient delivery of their 
products (i.e., contracts).197 This explains the prevalence of form 
contracts and implies that lawyers do not introduce changes 
without good reason.198 But the pressure to leave well enough 
alone—to use a standard clause despite its imperfections—is 
stronger in some contexts than others.199 
The empirical foundation for the contract-as-product model is 
based on studies of tradable financial contracts200 or adhesive 
form contracts.201 Financial contracts are traded on secondary 
markets, which encourages standardization and facilitates the 
pricing of contract terms.202 Adhesive forms are produced by one 
                                                                                                     
 196. See Richman, supra note 146, at 82 (noting that “basic organizational 
economics suggests that when a law firm, like any firm, has to produce large 
numbers of similar products, it constructs routines that are dedicated to the 
mass production of homogeneous goods”); D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, 
Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009) (noting that the 
routinization of contracts may make them resistant to change). 
 197. See Richman, supra note 146, at 79–83; cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In 
Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1998) (noting that inertia of 
contract terms can be reinforced by managerial biases against innovation). 
 198. The insistence that contracts are produced according to routine also 
may explain why lawyers sometimes attribute changes in the contract template 
to a mistake, even when the evidence clearly suggests the contrary. See W. 
Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, How Markets Work: The Lawyer’s Version, 
62 STUD. LAW, POL. & SOC’Y 107, 128 (2013) (discussing lawyer accounts of 
contract production). 
 199. See infra notes 200–221 and accompanying text (noting that patterns of 
innovation may differ across contract types).  
 200. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 146 at 59–60 (examining 
sovereign bonds); Weidemaier, supra note 164, at 107–11 (same); see also Kahan 
& Klausner, supra note 154, at 740–42 (noting—without invoking the product 
innovation literature—the sudden and widespread adoption of event risk 
covenants in corporate bonds shortly after the “watershed” buyout of RJR 
Nabisco). 
 201. See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 154, at 247–48 
(studying end user license agreements). 
 202. See Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of 
Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135–40 
(1989) (discussing pressures towards standardization, including the impact of 
secondary market purchasers); Michael Bradley, James D. Cox, & Mitu Gulati, 
The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons From the 
Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 312–17 (2010) (examining impact 
of market shock on sovereign bond prices and finding that some formulations of 
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party, which need not negotiate and can spread drafting costs 
across hundreds or thousands of transactions.203 Commercial 
contracts often lack these attributes, which means patterns of 
innovation may differ.204 It is reasonable to suppose that 
pharmaceutical industry development and distribution 
agreements, say, will be less standardized than corporate bonds. 
This may be as true of their dispute resolution clauses as it is of 
clauses that memorialize primary obligations. 
Finally, it is surely true that some procedural modifications 
entail high specification costs.205 Nevertheless, if customized 
procedure is indeed a rare phenomenon, this remains puzzling. 
Despite competition in the market for arbitral (and judicial) 
services,206 parties have only limited options in the choice of 
“bundled” procedure. Rules differ across courts and arbitration 
institutions, but the differences are often minor,207 and the 
available rules do not address many areas of interest. Changes to 
the default rules concerning attorney fees, statutes of limitation, 
litigation or arbitration costs, pleading, discovery, or evidence—
none of these predictably result from a forum selection or 
arbitration clause.208 Parties who want to tailor these and many 
other rules to their liking must do so directly in the contract. 
                                                                                                     
a common contract clause were associated with a pricing penalty). 
 203. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1990–91 (noting that 
customization may be more common in contracts of adhesion). 
 204. After a disruptive event, for example, secondary market trading may 
enable market participants to quickly identify and price superior terms in 
financial contracts. When thick secondary markets exist, contracts may 
transition much more quickly into a new, dominant standard. But such markets 
do not exist for most types of commercial contract. 
 205. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing high specification costs in commercial 
contracts). 
 206. See Wagner, supra note 65, at 1092–98 (exploring role of competition in 
market for dispute resolution). 
 207.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements, 
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1236–38 (2003) (discussing reasons why 
“market forces work to keep arbitration choices limited”); Richard E. Speidel, 
International Commercial Arbitration: Implementing the New York Convention, 
in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA at 189 (Cambridge University Press 2006) 
(noting that, in the context of international commercial arbitration, provider 
rules “do not vary dramatically in content from institution to institution”). 
 208.  Arbitration offers some of these benefits in a rough and unpredictable 
form. For example, arbitrators need not observe most evidentiary rules, 
although they may choose to do so. See e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules, 
1904 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865 (2015) 
Ex ante, it might border on the impossible to predict the net 
impact of an agreement to take no more than two depositions. 
But it is not clear why sophisticated commercial actors—by 
hypothesis, able to compare the benefits and costs of arbitration 
and litigation over all possible future disputes209—could not make 
a similar judgment about many other procedural modifications. 
Return to the example of arbitrator expertise. An expert 
arbitrator would lower dispute resolution costs and increase 
accuracy in at least some potential disputes.210 On the other 
hand, experts cost more, and the parties will incur this extra cost 
in every dispute, even those where expertise is of no value.211 To 
weigh the costs and benefits, parties must (in theory) anticipate 
the universe of possible disputes, the probability of each, and the 
impact of an expertise requirement in each case.212 But this 
daunting-sounding task may be easy in context. This is because, 
in many commercial transactions, the contract value is so large 
that even a minor increase in accuracy will provide deterrence 
benefits that dwarf the expected costs of arbitrator expertise.213 
In some settings, moreover, the costs of procedural 
customization are markedly lower. Consider the cost of 
enforcement uncertainty. It is not certain that courts will enforce 
                                                                                                     
supra note 91, at 22 (granting broad power to arbitrators in determining 
relevant evidence). And although some arbitration rules now explicitly authorize 
arbitrators to rule on dispositive motions, see id. at 22 (granting this authority), 
arbitrators are reluctant to do so, which effectively renders pleading standards 
irrelevant. Unless explicitly addressed in the contract, these matters will be left 
to the arbitrator’s ex post discretion. 
 209. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1954 (making this 
assumption). 
 210. See id. at 1963 (noting that an expert arbiter will eliminate the need to 
“engage in costly proof exercises”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. at 1962–63 (noting the potentially-significant costs of estimating 
the value of arbitrator expertise). 
 213. This assumes, reasonably, that an arbitrator with industry expertise is 
no less accurate for any category of dispute. As a simplified example, assume A 
stands to gain $10 million if its contract with B is performed or enforced, $0 
otherwise; that experts add value in ten percent of disputes; and that, in this 
subset, an expert is ten percent more likely to detect and remedy B’s breach. 
The value of an expertise requirement to A is $100,000 ($10 million x .1 x .1). 
Unless expert arbitrators cost $100,000 more than non-experts, A should prefer 
an expertise requirement. As A’s valuation of the contract increases, this 
conclusion becomes increasingly certain regardless of other assumptions. 
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some procedural clauses, including novel pleading standards214 
and strict discovery limits.215 This uncertainty reduces the 
expected value of these clauses.216 Parties who are willing to 
arbitrate, however, effectively reduce enforcement uncertainty to 
zero.217 For that reason, it is reasonable to suppose that we will 
find more procedural customization when the contract also 
includes an arbitration clause. 
Because of these open questions, it is hard to evaluate the 
prevailing explanations for the rarity of customized procedure. 
The evidence, moreover, remains incomplete. To do more than 
speculate, we need a holistic picture of how commercial contracts 
address the subject of dispute resolution. 
IV. A Closer Look at Commercial Contracts 
A. The Dataset 
This section analyzes a sample of material contracts that 
were attached as exhibits to corporate SEC filings between 
                                                                                                     
 214. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 398 (noting uncertainty of enforcement). 
 215. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1346 (noting doubts about enforceability of 
discovery agreements). 
 216. Kapeliuk & Klement, see Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 
18, give the example of a discovery limit that will save each party five in 
litigation costs without predictably working to either party’s advantage. Ex 
ante, the parties will agree to the clause. Enforcement uncertainty, however, 
reduces the expected value. For example, if there is only a fifty percent chance 
that the clause will be enforced, the expected savings to each is only 2.5. 
Uncertainty also introduces unwarranted variance. This is because the amount 
actually saved will be either zero or five (many commercial transactions do not 
recur often enough to average out the risk), and the uncertainty may complicate 
decisions about how much to invest in performance. 
 217. By and large, commercial parties may structure the arbitration process 
however they please. Cf. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (providing only limited grounds for 
vacatur of an arbitration award). To qualify for this lenient treatment, a dispute 
resolution process must be considered “arbitration,” but the definition of that 
term imposes few procedural limits. Cf. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 
536 U.S. 355, 382 (2002) (noting that the traditional definition of arbitration 
requires only that the parties “choose a judge to render a final and binding 
decision on the merits of the controversy and on the basis of proofs presented by 
the parties”) (quoting 1 I. MACNEIL, R. SPEIDEL, & T. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 2.1.1 (1995)).  
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January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2012.218 By definition, 
material contracts are not representative of all contracts.219 But 
the factors that make them unrepresentative—high stakes, 
sophisticated parties—mean that the barriers to procedural 
contracting are relatively low.220 If parties do not adopt custom 
procedural rules when the stakes are high, they are unlikely to do 
so in other commercial settings.221 Furthermore, because most of 
the relevant studies also focus (at least in part) on material 
contracts, the sample facilitates comparison with existing 
research.222 
The sample was drawn from the EDGAR database on 
Bloomberg Law.223 It emphasizes commercial agreements, 
including manufacturing and supply agreements, distribution 
agreements, licensing and development agreements, and 
marketing and other services agreements.224 Excluding 
                                                                                                     
 218. Two research assistants performed the initial coding. Each received a 
coding book and, after a training period, one-half of the contracts. I spot-checked 
contracts that were coded as having no custom procedural clauses (other than a 
choice of law clause). For contracts coded as having one or more custom 
procedural clauses, I re-checked the coding in its entirety. 
 219. Material contracts include, among others, those “not made in the 
ordinary course of business which is material to the registrant and is to be 
performed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the registration statement 
or report or was entered into not more than two years before such filing.” 17 
C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10)(i) (2014). 
 220. For example, parties to material contracts can more easily justify the 
investments necessary to identify and provide for efficient dispute resolution 
procedures. See The Flight to NY, supra note 132, at 1487 (noting that material 
contracts “receive some degree of care and attention during the negotiation and 
drafting phase”). 
 221. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 406 (noting that large firms are more 
likely to adopt efficient contract terms).  
 222. See supra note 129 (noting studies relying on samples of material 
contracts). 
 223. I am indebted to Daniel Dalnekoff and Andrew Gilman at Bloomberg 
for their assistance with the EDGAR database and for helpful discussions of 
Bloomberg’s “DealMaker” database of material contracts. 
 224. As noted, other studies include a greater percentage of merger and 
lending contracts. Among other differences, commercial contracts may be more 
likely than merger and lending contracts to involve hard-to-specify performance 
obligations. As an example, consider a development agreement in which parties 
agree to “cooperate . . . in performing an investigation regarding the 
manufacturing of clinical samples and later commercial supplies” of a product 
that cannot be sold without regulatory approval, with the agreement to last 
(subject to termination rights) until the product has been approved and the 
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duplicates and a handful of contracts that were too heavily 
redacted to be useful, the sample includes 402 contracts. 
Approximately 60% (239) involve domestic transactions between 
U.S. parties, 34% involve cross-border transactions, and another 
6% involve transactions between non-U.S. parties located in the 
same country. Table 2 provides more detail about the nature of 
the contracts and the location of the parties.225 
  
                                                                                                     
parties have negotiated a separate manufacturing agreement. Process 
Development Agreement dated Feb. 8, 2008 Between BioDelivery Scis. Int’l. and 
LTS Lohmann Therapie-Systeme AG (on file with author). Parties to such 
under-specified contracts may assign particular value to custom procedure. 
Thus, the sample was designed to emphasize commercial transactions.  
I identified contracts using the following query: “(supply n/2 agreement) OR 
(develop! n/2 agreement) OR (distribut! n/2 agreement) OR (manufactur! n/2 
agreement) OR (export! n/2 agreement) OR (import! n/2 agreement) OR (market! 
n/2 agreement) OR (resell! n/2 agreement). This search typically identified 
between 400 and 700 relevant contracts each year. Each contract had a 10% 
chance of inclusion in the data set, with the caveat that, because of time and 
resource constraints, we coded a maximum of forty contracts for a given year. 
This limitation means that contracts attached to SEC filings made earlier in the 
year had a greater chance of inclusion. (There is no reason to think filing date is 
correlated with the use of custom procedural clauses.) 
 225. Occasionally, it was not possible to code all relevant variables, often 
because information was redacted from the document filed with the SEC. Unless 
the contract was too heavily redacted to yield useful information, I included it in 
the dataset. Thus, although the dataset includes 402 total contracts, the 
numbers reported in Table 1 and elsewhere do not always add up to this 
amount. 
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Table 2. Proportion of Contracts, by Transaction Type 
and Party Location 
(Number of Contracts in Parentheses) 
Total Contracts in Dataset 402 
Type of Transaction:  
Development Agreement 14.7% (59) 
Distribution Agreement 21.9% (88) 




Location of the Parties:  
U.S. Parties Only 59.9% (239) 
Cross-Border, U.S. and Non-U.S. 
Parties 
29.1% (116) 
Cross-Border, Non-U.S. Parties 
Only 
5.0% (20) 
Non-U.S. Parties from the Same 
Country 
6.0% (24) 
The sample overcomes some of the limitations present (to 
varying degrees) in other studies. First, many studies focus on 
only a small number of custom terms. Recall that the literature 
posits that parties can benefit by adjusting burdens of proof, 
pleading requirements, evidentiary rules, and many other details 
of adjudication procedure.226 Many of the relevant studies simply 
do not code for these variables.227 Those that do, such as 
Hoffman’s study of material contracts filed with the SEC, have 
sometimes relied on broad text searches of the relevant 
                                                                                                     
 226. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text (discussing types of 
procedural customization). 
 227. This is not a criticism. Often researchers are interested in different 
questions. Two of the relevant Eisenberg and Miller studies, for example, 
explore forum selection, choice of law, and the role of state competition in 
shaping these choices. See Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129, at 1988–99, 2001–11 
(studying forum selection and choice of law); The Flight to NY, supra note 132, 
at 154 (noting the possibility that competition for corporate charters may lead 
“to adoption of state corporation law that maximizes the value of companies 
incorporated in those states”). Given these questions, coding for procedural 
tailoring would have made little sense. Likewise, O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra 
note 129, code for a range of custom procedural terms, but the authors were 
focused on customization in arbitration, and the sample included only CEO 
employment contracts. 
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database.228 Searches like this are valuable and can support 
inferences about the relative prevalence of particular terms, but 
the results are necessarily impressionistic.229 Finally, studies 
often do not examine contracting practices over time and thus 
cannot easily detect behavioral shifts.230 Such shifts might be 
caused by disruptive events such as major court decisions231 or by 
changes in party attitudes towards particular adjudication 
“products.” For example, surveys of corporate counsel suggest 
that “arbitration usage [is] contracting in most conflict settings,” 
including commercial contract disputes.232 
B. A First Look: Dispute Resolution as a Point in Negotiations 
If parties worry that bargaining over dispute resolution 
procedures will signal negative information,233 that concern is not 
evident in the contracts. To the contrary, almost every contract 
alters the default rules of adjudication in one or more ways, and 
many establish detailed procedures to be followed both before and 
after the filing of a formal claim.234 
                                                                                                     
 228. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 407–09 (using broad text searches in the 
EDGAR database). 
 229. See id. at 406 (noting that text searches are impressionistic but can 
provide information about the relative rates of contract terms). 
 230. Drahozal and Rutledge study franchise contracts over an extended 
period of time but focus on arbitration clauses and waivers of the right to bring 
a class action. See generally Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 130.  
 231. See Hoffman, supra note 11, 426 (noting the potential impact of major 
judicial decisions); Choi et al., supra note 146, at 1–3 (discussing the effect of 
disruptive events on contracts). 
 232. See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 7, at 32, 45 chart G (reporting 
survey results). 
 233. See supra Part II.B.1 (acknowledging and attempting to explain the 
rarity of customized procedure). 
 234. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1952–61 (discussing the 
many options parties have when considering dispute resolution procedure in 
their contracts). 
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1. Resolving Disputes Before the Filing of Formal Adversary 
Proceedings 
A significant minority of the contracts include detailed, 
multi-tier dispute resolution procedures. In the event of a 
dispute, these clauses first require informal, non-binding dispute 
resolution processes, such as negotiation and mediation, and only 
then allow formal proceedings in arbitration or litigation.235 Some 
of these clauses are perfunctory, but others are elaborate. As an 
example, one contract establishes this multi-tier process:  
 
• After notice of a dispute, parties have ten days to begin 
successive rounds of negotiation. If negotiators do not 
reach agreement within fifteen days, responsibility for 
negotiations passes to the next rung in the corporate 
hierarchy. 
• If there is no resolution after 45 days, the parties must 
attend mediation conducted by a mediator with 
industry expertise.  
• If the parties still cannot resolve the dispute, either 
may initiate litigation.236 
Most contracts are not so detailed, and multi-tier ADR 
mechanisms like this are comparatively rare. As Table 3 
indicates, the most common clause simply obliges the parties to 
negotiate before initiating arbitration or litigation. Nevertheless, 
over 40% of contracts in the dataset include some form of non-
binding ADR requirement. 
                                                                                                     
 235. On the (sometimes overstated) differences between mediation and 
arbitration and the many variants of mediation, see Nancy A. Welsh and 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into 
Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 71, 105–15 
(2013). 
 236. Manufacturing, Sales & Marketing Agreement dated April 26, 2002 
between Nomaco, Inc. and RBX Industries, Inc., ¶ 15(g). This contract, 
admittedly one of the more elaborate examples, also specifies the location of the 
mediation, explicitly obliges the parties to negotiate in good faith, allocates the 
costs of mediation, identifies the preferred mediator by name, and creates 
exceptions where parties may bypass the ADR process.  
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Table 3. Proportion of Contracts Requiring 
Non-Binding ADR 
(Number of Contracts in Parentheses) 
Negotiation Only 36.1% (145) 
Mediation Only 3.0% (12) 
Multi-Tier 5.2% (21) 
No Requirement 55.7% (224) 
Because negotiation and mediation requirements involve 
non-binding dispute resolution, they tend to escape the notice of 
scholars interested in the ability to modify judicial or arbitral 
procedures.237 In at least two respects, however, negotiation and 
mediation requirements are relevant to debates over customized 
procedure. First, widespread use of these clauses suggests that 
dispute resolution is not a taboo subject during the contract 
formation stage.238 Second, parties potentially can use negotiation 
and mediation to gather information, narrow the substantive 
issues in dispute, or even agree to modify otherwise applicable 
procedural rules.239 To the extent this happens, negotiation and 
mediation requirements serve as (incomplete) substitutes for ex 
ante contracts over adjudication procedure. 
2. Changing the Rules of Binding Adjudication 
Turning our attention to binding adjudication, virtually 
every contract alters at least one default rule, even if we do not 
consider choice of law clauses (by far the most common custom 
term, discussed in the next section).240 More than three-quarters 
(76.1%) of contracts include an arbitration or forum selection 
clause incorporating the bundled rules of the designated court or 
                                                                                                     
 237. See, e.g., Contractualizing Procedure, supra note 1, at 14 (defining 
procedural clauses to include only those that affect the way disputes will be 
litigated or condition payments on litigation behavior). 
 238. See infra Part V.A (noting that signaling theories are hard to square 
with frequent and varied use of clauses addressing dispute resolution). 
 239. Cf. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 
WISC. L. REV. 831, 849 (2001) (noting possibility that mediation can facilitate 
discussion of procedures for dispute resolution). 
 240. See infra Figure 1 (showing the cumulative proportion of contracts with 
at least one procedural modification, exclusive of choice of law clauses). 
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arbitral institution.241 Note that the arbitration count includes 
only contracts that select arbitration as the default method of 
adjudicating most claims (subject to litigation carve-outs).242 It 
thus excludes contracts that send narrow questions, such as those 
involving scientific or financial matters, for binding resolution by 
private experts.243 Although courts might treat these as 
arbitration agreements,244 I report them separately because they 
are so narrow in scope; the parties must litigate most disputes. 
These clauses are analogous to the carve-ins discussed by 
Drahozal and O’Hara O’Connor,245 and I will adopt that term.246 
Of the remaining contracts—those without arbitration or 
forum selection clauses—most include at least one other 
                                                                                                     
 241. Infra Figure 1. 
 242. Infra Figure 1. 
 243. See Stipanowich, supra note 239, at 844–47 (discussing judicial 
treatment of such clauses). 
 244. See id. (explaining how certain agreements may “bear some or all of the 
earmarks of ‘binding arbitration’ and may even be identified by the agreement 
as ‘arbitration’”). Compare Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC, 683 F.3d 
684, 693–94 (6th Cir. 2012) (appraisal process did not constitute arbitration), 
and Salt Lake Tribune Pub. Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 689–92 
(10th Cir. 2004) (same) with Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 
374 F.3d 1, 7–8 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting a clause providing for “final 
determination” of certain valuation issues by accounting firm constituted 
arbitration); cf. Ne. Fin. Corp. v. Ins. Corp. of N. Am., 757 F. Supp. 381, 383–84 
(D. Del. 1991) (discussing Delaware law distinguishing arbitration from 
appraisal).  
The distinction can be important. Federal law entitles parties to what 
amounts to an order of specific performance enforcing an arbitration agreement. 
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012); see Necchi S.P.A. v. Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp., 348 
F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1965) (“An order under the Federal Arbitration Act 
compelling a party to arbitrate is simply an order granting specific performance 
of an arbitration provision . . . .”). That remedy may or may not be available in 
cases where the clause does not qualify as arbitration under federal (or state) 
law. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7601 (MCKINNEY 2012) (authorizing specific 
performance of agreements “that a question of valuation, appraisal or other 
issue or controversy be determined by a person named or to be selected”). 
 245. See Drazhozal & O’Connor, supra note 10, at 1950 (exploring use of 
carve-outs to unbundle forum procedural rules). 
 246. Assuming courts defer to the third party’s decision, these clauses 
modify the rules of litigation by shifting primary fact-finding responsibility to a 
private party. See, e.g., State Room, Inc. v. MA-60 State Assocs., LLC, 995 
N.E.2d 807, 811–13 (Mass. Ct. App. 2013) (distinguishing appraisal from 
arbitration and explaining limited judicial review of appraisal conducted 
pursuant to commercial lease). 
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procedural modification.247 The list includes clauses that waive 
the right to jury trial, entitle the prevailing party to attorney 
fees, shorten the statute of limitations, expand or restrict 
depositions or document discovery, provide a method for serving 
process, allocate burdens of proof, waive hearsay objections,248 or 
send limited questions to third-party neutrals (i.e., carve-ins).249 
Taking these modifications into account, almost 90% of contracts 
modify the background rules of litigation in some way.250 If we 
add clauses that expand or limit remedies for breach, only 6.5% of 











                                                                                                     
 247. See infra Figure 1 (reporting the proportion of contracts with at least 
one procedural modification). 
 248. A contract was counted as waiving hearsay objections if it included a 
blanket waiver of all objections. A few contracts may have included narrow 
waivers of best evidence and hearsay objections to the admissibility of copies 
instead of originals. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 417 (finding only a few such 
contracts in a broad text-based search of EDGAR). 
 249. Infra Figure 1. 
 250. Infra Figure 1. 
 251. Infra Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Cumulative Proportion of Contracts  
with at Least One Procedural Modification 
Including any of the  
following: loser - pays attorney  
fees, expanded/restricted  
discovery, burden of proof,  
shortened claims period,  
service of process,  
independent expert/lab:  
86.5% of total Including jury waivers:  
76.9% of total 
Arbitration or forum  
selection clause:  
76.1% of total 
Including clauses  
expanding or restricting  
remedies: 93.8% of total 
Proportion without any  
modification (choice of law  
excluded): 6.5% of total 
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C. A More Detailed View: Off-the-Rack and Custom Rules 
Figure 1 shows that most contracts include an arbitration or 
forum selection clause, and many include additional (or 
alternative) custom terms. This Section provides details, 
beginning with the choice of bundled arbitration or court 
procedures. Unless otherwise noted, only contracts that involve at 
least one U.S. party are included in the results.252 
1. Choice of Law and Forum: The Preference for New York 
Prior research has found a marked preference for New York 
law and New York courts, although the research samples 
consisted entirely or predominately of corporate and lending 
transactions.253 That preference is also apparent in the present 
sample of manufacturing, licensing, and other commercial 
contracts.254 Almost every contract in the dataset (95.7%) 
includes a choice of law clause, thereby incorporating off-the-rack 
rules to govern the parties’ primary obligations.255 In domestic 
transactions, contracts most often designate New York law, 
followed by California and Delaware.256 Cross-border contracts 
                                                                                                     
 252. Contracts between non-United States parties are of course less likely to 
select the law of a United States state. See Cuniberti, supra note 131, at 14–17 
(studying international contracts—only a subset of which involved any United 
States party—and finding a preference for English and Swiss law over the law 
of a state of the United States). 
 253. See, e.g., The Flight to NY, supra note 133, 1488 (using mostly financial 
contracts and contracts related to mergers or asset sales, but including several 
other agreement types); Ex Ante Choices, supra note 129 (using merger 
agreements). For evidence of how lawyers describe the selection of governing 
law, see Kostritsky, supra note 88. 
 254. The dataset includes 355 contracts involving at least one United States 
party, 340 of which have a choice of law clause. Three of these were excluded 
because the choice of law clause was redacted. 
 255. This is consistent with the results of other studies. See supra note 131.  
 256. Although Eisenberg and Miller report more frequent use of New York 
law, their dataset includes a greater proportion of financial and corporate 
transactions for which New York law may have greater appeal. See The Flight to 
NY, supra note 133, at 1492 (noting that licensing, employment, and settlement 
agreements do not “fall[] within the core areas for which New York and 
Delaware have campaigned”). For the subset of licensing agreements, they 
report 20.4% of contracts choose New York law, 16.3% choose California law, 
and 10.2% choose Delaware law. Id. at 1491 tbl.3. These figures correspond 
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exhibit the same pattern, except that a greater proportion selects 












Although only around one in five contracts calls for the 
application of New York law, the appeal of that state’s law 
becomes more apparent when we recognize that most 
transactions are negotiated or performed in a state where at least 
one party has its principal place of business.258 For that reason, 
there is likely to be a strong association between the law selected 
in the contract and the location of the parties.259 There may also 
be a lesser association between choice of law and place of 
incorporation, although that seems unlikely in commercial 
transactions (as opposed to, say, merger agreements).260  
One way to test the appeal of a state’s law is to examine how 
frequently contracts designate that law when neither party is 
                                                                                                     
closely to those reported in the main text. Infra Figure 2.  
 257. See infra Figure 2 (reporting choice of law clauses). 
 258. See The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1479 (“A party’s business 
location often relates to where events under a contract occur.”). 
 259. See The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1479 (noting a link between 
place of business and events relevant to the contract). 
 260. See id. at 1495–96 tbl.6 (reporting an association between place of 































Figure 2. Governing Law, by Transaction Type 
Domestic 
Cross-border 
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incorporated or principally located in the state.261 Figure 3 shows 
New York’s dominance on this measure in domestic 
transactions.262 When the chosen law does not correspond to 
party location or place of incorporation, the choice is almost 
always New York.263 Parties to cross-border transactions showed 
a similar preference for New York law, although many also 









                                                                                                     
 261. See id. at 1499–1500 (reporting that, in their sample of contracts, New 
York had “the highest rate of contracts specifying its law that lack a measurable 
contact with the state”). 
 262. The dataset includes 325 contracts for which it was possible to code the 
choice-of-law variable as well as information related to the principal place of 
business and place of incorporation of the parties. For similar findings in the 
domestic context, see The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1499 tbl.9 (finding 
that contracts without a core contact with New York—defined as a match 
between the chosen law and (i) either party’s principal place of business or state 
of incorporation or (ii) the attorney’s locale—frequently designated that state’s 
as the governing law). 
 263. See infra Figure 3 (showing that, when no party is principally located 
or incorporated in the designated state, New York is designated 73% of the 
time). 
 264. In domestic transactions, 20.1% involved a mismatch between the 
designated law and the parties’ principal places of business and states of 
incorporation. Such mismatches occurred more frequently (32.4%) in cross-
border transactions.  Here, too, New York law dominated, although not quite to 
the same degree. Of this subset of cross-border contracts, 55.9% chose New York 
law and 20.6% chose the law of a foreign country with no apparent connection to 





















Figure 3. Choice of Law When No Party Is  
Principally Located or Incorporated in the  
Designated State 
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The preference for New York law also manifests in forum 
selection decisions.265 Nearly forty percent (39.7%) of the 
contracts include a forum selection clause.266 Parties generally 
prefer to litigate in the state whose law governs the 
transaction,267 so not surprisingly, New York is the most 
frequently designated forum.268 Given the preferred status of 
New York law, this also means that, when a contract calls for 
litigation in a jurisdiction with no obvious connection to the 









                                                                                                     
 265. See infra Figure 4 (showing how in forum selection clauses New York is 
often the preferred forum in either domestic or cross-border contracts). 
 266. Some contracts include both arbitration and forum selection clauses. 
The count in the text includes only those where a judicial forum is designated to 
enforce at least some of the parties’ primary obligations. It includes contracts 
that allow for litigation on the merits or let parties to go to court for preliminary 
injunctive relief, but excludes contracts that only designate a forum for 
enforcing the arbitration agreement or award. 
 267. In the sample studied here, 93.3% of contracts that designated both a 
governing law and a litigation forum designated the same state for both. See 
also The Flight to NY, supra note 133, at 1503 (“When a forum is specified, it 
overwhelmingly corresponds with a contract’s choice of law.”). 
 268. See infra Figure 4 (reporting choice of forum by transaction type). 
 269. Twenty-eight contracts involve such a mismatch; twenty-one of these 
provide for litigation in New York. I do not mean to express a firm view on the 
direction of causation. For example, it is possible that parties generally prefer 
New York courts, and select New York law because that is the law those courts 
are accustomed to applying. 

















Courts generally enforce forum selection clauses but 
sometimes interpret them as permissive rather than 
mandatory.270 A clause open to this interpretation lets parties sue 
and be sued in the designated court (assuming subject matter 
jurisdiction) but leaves open the possibility of litigation 
elsewhere.271 Parties who want to litigate only in the designated 
forum must state this expressly.272 About three-quarters of the 
contracts with forum selection clauses (73.2%) do so.273 
                                                                                                     
 270. 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15.15 (4th ed.). 
 271. See id. (explaining how forum selection clauses may be interpreted as 
permissive when the parties’ intent to litigate in a particular forum is not clear). 
 272. See id. (explaining how an exclusive forum selection clause will be 
enforced so long as the parties “clearly express their intent to limit litigation to 
that particular forum”). 
 273. I treated a forum selection clause as exclusive only if it used “exclusive” 
or similar words (e.g., “only”, “waives all other jurisdictions,” etc.) to describe the 
designated forum. Courts sometimes interpret less direct language (such as 
“jurisdiction and venue shall be . . . .”) as providing for exclusive jurisdiction, but 
parties who use such language cannot be certain of its effect. See ASM 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Allen, 656 F. Supp. 838, 839–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (interpreting 






















Figure 4. Forum Choice by Transaction Type 
Domestic 
Cross-Border 
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2. Arbitration and the Dominance of the AAA and ICC 
Nearly half of the contracts (48.2%) include an arbitration 
clause.274 As noted, this excludes contracts that call for binding, 
third-party resolution only of narrow technical or scientific 
questions.275 As expected, arbitration clauses appear more 
frequently (61.0%) in contracts involving cross-border 
transactions,276 where arbitration has enforcement and other 
advantages over litigation in national courts.277 
Although surveys of corporate counsel suggest a decrease in 
the use of arbitration since the late 1990s,278 no such decrease is 
apparent in this sample. Given the limited size of the dataset, 
there is expected, year-to-year variance in the proportion of 
contracts with arbitration clauses. This includes a seemingly 
sharp drop for contracts with an initial term beginning in 2012, 
although this is likely due to the small number of contracts (ten) 
for that year.279 (For this reason, Figure 5 depicts 2012 contracts 
separately.) Despite the variance, there is no indication that 
arbitration has fallen seriously out of favor. In domestic 
transactions, the proportion of contracts with arbitration clauses 
                                                                                                     
 274. Infra Table 4. 
 275. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (distinguishing such carve-
ins from contracts providing for arbitration as the default method of dispute 
resolution). 
 276. For comparative results, see, e.g., Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, 
at 23–24 tbl.5 (excluding contracts between two non-US parties from the same 
country, reporting arbitration clauses in 35.7% of domestic contracts and 42.9% 
of contracts between companies from different countries); The Flight from 
Arbitration, supra note 129, at 353 tbl.4 (finding only 20% overall incidence of 
arbitration in contracts involving a non-United States party, but significant 
variance by contract type—e.g., 63.4% of licensing agreements); Drahozal & 
Ware, supra note 129, at 465–66 tbl.4 (reporting arbitration usage of 47.6% and 
71%, respectively, in domestic and international joint venture agreements).  
 277. See Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in International 
Dispute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 49, 52–58 (2012) (discussing these 
advantages and the possibility that they may be eroded by developments in 
international civil litigation). 
 278. See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 7, at 8–10 (reporting survey 
results describing a trend towards non-binding forms of alternative dispute 
resolution). 
 279. Contracts were collected from SEC filings through December 31, 2012. 
Material contracts pre-date a company’s SEC filings, often by a number of years. 
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declines after a peak in 2003 but remains higher, in each 












More than ninety percent (92.3%) of contracts that provide 
for arbitration specify the provider whose rules will govern the 
process.280 In domestic transactions, the AAA dominates; over 
80% of contracts call for arbitration under its rules.281 In cross-
border transactions, the ICC and AAA share the dominant role.282 
 
                                                                                                     
 280. This is consistent with studies of other contract types. See O’Hara 
O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 162 (reporting that 93% of contracts with 
arbitration clauses in a sample of CEO employment contracts chose an 
arbitration association). Many contracts, however, designate the rules 
imperfectly or incompletely. For example, some contracts provide for arbitration 
under “AAA rules,” or language to that effect, without identifying which of the 
AAA’s many rules the parties want to apply. 
 281. The AAA also appears to dominate the domestic arbitration market in 
joint venture and executive employment contracts. See Christopher R. Drahozal 
& Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1126–27 
(2011) (finding the AAA was the designated provider in 85.7% of a 2007 sample 
of franchise agreements and 88.9% of a 2008 sample of domestic joint venture 
agreements); O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129 at 162–64 (finding that 
90% of a sample of CEO employment contracts specified AAA arbitration). 
 282. See infra Figure 6 (reporting choice of arbitration provider in domestic 
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Figure 5. Proportion of Domestic and X - Border  
contracts with arbitration clauses, 2000 - 2012 
Domestic Cross border 
Maximum, domestic  
contracts (52.6%) 
Minimum, domestic  
contracts (33.3) 
Maximum, x - border  
contracts (80%) 
Minimum, x - border 
contracts (41.7%) 







3. Customizing Off-the-Rack Rules 
The discussion thus far has shown that most commercial 
contracts use forum selection and arbitration clauses to allocate 
disputes to a preferred forum, and also that some forums 
dominate these markets. As noted, parties also can draft custom 
procedural clauses to supplement or replace the bundled rules of 
their chosen forum.283 Most contracts, however, contain relatively 
few custom clauses.284 
Table 4 divides the dataset into contracts with arbitration 
clauses, contracts with forum selection (but not arbitration) 
clauses, and contracts that do not explicitly incorporate bundled 
procedural rules. Within these categories, it reports the frequency 
of twelve modifications to rules of procedure and evidence. 
Excluding choice of law clauses, the maximum number of 
modifications in any contract is five; the median number is 
zero.285 This means that most contracts do not include any of 
these twelve custom clauses.286 For the sake of comparison—and 
                                                                                                     
 283. See supra Part II.B (discussing the option to select and supplement 
bundled forum procedural rules). 
 284. See infra Table 4 (showing relatively few custom clauses aside from 
arbitration and forum selection clauses). 
 285. Infra Table 4. 
















Figure 6. Choice of Arbitration Provider  
in Domestic and Cross - border Contracts 
Domestic 
Cross-border 
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to demonstrate that parties routinely do alter non-procedural 
rules—Table 4 also reports the frequency of five modifications to 
the rules governing remedies. The fact that most contracts alter 
the background law of remedies highlights the puzzle: Why are 
procedural modifications so rare?  
Table 4. Procedural Tailoring in Arbitration, When Parties Select a 














Total Contracts 355 171 99 85 
Additional 
Procedural Clauses     
  Jury Waiver 8.2% (29) 6.4% (11) 15.2% (15) 3.5% (3) 
  Carve-in n/a n/a 23.2% (23) 14.1% (12) 
  Carve-out from 
Arbitration n/a 48.5% (83) n/a n/a 





n/a 24.6% (42) n/a n/a 
  Loser Pays 
Attorney Fees 23.9% (85) 25.7% (44) 26.3% (26) 17.6% (15) 
  Shortens Statute of 
Limitations 2.8% (10) 2.3% (4) 2.0% (2) 4.7% (4) 
  Expands Deposition 
Rights 2.8% (10) 5.3% (9) 1.0% (1) 0% 
  Limits Deposition 
Rights 2.2% (8) 4.7% (8) 0% 0% 
  Expands Document 
Discovery 2.8% (10) 4.7% (8) 2.0% (2) 0% 
  Waives Hearsay 
Objections 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Provides for Service 
of Process 5.9% (21) 5.3% (9) 12.1% (12) 0% 
                                                                                                     
taken in making comparisons. For example, carve-outs by definition exist only 
when the contract includes an arbitration agreement. There is also a separate 
forum selection category relevant only to contracts with arbitration agreements. 
These forum selection clauses designate the forum for carved out claims, 
litigation to enforce the arbitration agreement or award, or both. 
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Table 4. Procedural Tailoring in Arbitration, When Parties Select a 
Forum, and When Parties Do Neither 
Addresses Burden of 
Proof 1.1% (4) 1.2% (2) 1.0% (1) 1.2% (1) 
Additional Clauses 
Per Contract287     
Mean 0.71 0.82 0.83 0.41 
Median 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Standard 
Deviation 0.93 1.07 0.89 0.56 
Range 0–5 0–5 0–3 0–2 
Remedies     
 Imposes Any 
Remedy 
Limitation 
71.5% (254) 74.9% (128) 73.7% (73) 62.4% (53) 
 Forbids Punitive 
Damages 40.8% (145) 44.4% (76) 42.4% (42) 31.8% (27) 
 No Consequential 
Damages 69.9% (248) 71.9% (123) 72.7% (72) 62.4% (53) 
 Forbids Multiple 
Damages 2.2% (8) 4.1% (7) 1.0% (1) 0% 
 Sets Damages 
Maximum 19.2% (68) 18.7% (32) 21.2% (21) 17.6% (15) 
 Liquidated Damages 6.5% (23) 4.1% (7) 10.1% (10) 7.1% (6) 
Given these findings, it is fair to say that procedural 
contracting consists primarily of the parties’ choice of their preferred 
set of off-the-rack rules in arbitration or litigation.288 Parties are not 
indifferent to dispute resolution or unwilling to inject the prospect of 
breach into negotiations. So much is clear from the prevalence of 
                                                                                                     
 287. The totals are for additional procedural modifications and thus exclude 
any initial choice of arbitration or forum. Choice of law clauses are also 
excluded. 
 288. For simplicity, the table combines all contracts involving at least one 
U.S. party, whether or not the contract involves a cross-border transaction. 
Parties to cross-border transactions arguably require more procedural autonomy 
than parties to purely domestic transactions. See Strong, supra note 79, at 13 
(suggesting that “the desire for procedural autonomy may be heightened in 
international matters”). But this is not reflected in the contracts. In every 
category, parties to cross-border transactions engaged in less tailoring than 
parties to domestic transactions. Across all domestic transactions, the mean 
number of additional modifications was 0.76. In cross-border transactions, the 
mean was 0.62. 
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arbitration, forum selection, and remedy-modifying clauses.289 
Likewise, carve-outs, carve-ins, and attorney fee-shifting clauses 
each appear in a substantial minority of contracts.290 But few 
contracts show evidence of detailed procedural customization. In 
particular, few contracts address the routine details of 
adjudication procedure, such as the rules of evidence and 
discovery.291 
In relative terms, however, some clauses are fairly common. 
These include carve-outs from arbitration (48.5% of arbitration 
agreements), loser-pays attorney fee clauses (23.9% of all 
contracts),292 carve-ins sending discrete issues to third-party 
experts (19% of contracts without an arbitration clause), and jury 
trial waivers (8.2%).293 Moreover, the fact that arbitration 
agreements more often address the details of discovery is 
consistent with the hypothesis that arbitration agreements may 
                                                                                                     
 289. See supra Table 4 (identifying arbitration, forum selection, and 
remedial modification clauses as the most frequently used in contracts that 
choose procedure). 
 290. Supra Table 4. 
 291. Nor did any contracts explicitly adopt a different pleading standard, 
such as the pre-Twombly standard. See Kapeliuk & Klement, Contracting 
Around Twombly, supra note 121, at 11, 15–22 (suggesting that parties might 
adopt a less demanding pleading standard). 
 292. This proportion requires the loser pay the winner’s attorney fees. A 
greater proportion (38.5%) allows but does not require fee-shifting. Such clauses 
also change the default rule, which does not typically grant this discretion to the 
adjudicator. Some observers suggest that arbitrators have discretion to award 
fees in the absence of express authorization. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 
129, at 166. This may be technically correct; some courts, for example, interpret 
AAA arbitration rules this way. See 2 DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
§ 48.1 (2014). But it seems unlikely that arbitrators will routinely depart from 
background legal rules without express authorization. Arbitrators typically act 
as if parties want them to apply background legal rules, even when not 
technically required. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging Lite: How 
Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1092, 1124–35 (2012) 
(demonstrating that arbitrators rarely cite other arbitration awards and that 
arbitration awards and judicial opinions exhibit relatively similar citation 
practices).  
 293. Some contracts with arbitration clauses also waive the right to jury 
trial. These waivers are relevant in several scenarios. First, but for the waiver, a 
party might demand a jury trial in litigation over the enforceability of the 
arbitration clause. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (providing for a jury trial when 
demanded by the party opposing a petition to compel arbitration). Second, but 
for the waiver, a party might demand a jury trial in cases where the arbitration 
clause is unenforceable or inapplicable. Id. 
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involve somewhat greater procedural tailoring.294 When we turn 
to procedural modifications unique to arbitration, the support for 
that hypothesis grows much stronger. 
4. A Closer Look at Arbitration 
Some procedural modifications can appear only in contracts 
with arbitration agreements. Table 5 reports the frequency of use 
of sixteen such clauses,295 which can be grouped according to 
function: 
Scope of arbitration: If parties disagree about the scope of 
their agreement to arbitrate, arbitration law supplies 
presumptions to resolve the disagreement.296 These are default 
rules that the parties can expressly override by contract. 
Carve-outs (also reported in Table 4) narrow the presumptive 
scope of arbitration by allowing or requiring litigation of a 
subset of disputes.297 So-called “arbitrability clauses”298 
expand the presumptive scope of arbitration by letting the 
arbitrator resolve disputes over the enforceability and scope of 
the arbitration clause itself.299 
                                                                                                     
 294. Contracts with arbitration clauses were significantly more likely to 
include one of the three custom, discovery-related clauses (χ2(1, N=355)=14.9, 
p  < .001). These include clauses that expand or limit deposition rights and 
clauses that expand document discovery rights. Express limits on document 
discovery were not explicitly coded, but few, if any, contracts included one. 
 295. Because a few contracts had the relevant portions redacted, the number 
of contracts ranges from 164 to 171, depending on the clause. 
 296. For example, “doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should 
be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 (1983). 
 297. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text (describing carve-ins and 
carve-outs). 
 298. See, e.g., Societe Generale de Surveillance, S.A. v. Raytheon European 
Mgmt. Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863, 869 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that ICC arbitration 
rules permit the arbitrator to resolve questions of the arbitrator’s “jurisdiction”). 
 299. See generally Alan S. Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About 
“Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1 (2003). 
Only contracts that explicitly assigned such questions to the arbitrator were 
coded as having an arbitrability clause. Many contracts implicitly assign them 
to arbitrators by incorporating provider rules with that effect. Some courts, 
however, require more express language. Compare Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Triplefine 
Int’l Corp., 322 F.3d 115, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that incorporation of 
ICC rules evidenced intent to arbitrate questions of arbitrability), with 
Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. San Juan Basin Royalty Tr., 249 S.W.3d 34, 
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Arbitration costs: Arbitration involves substantial costs not 
present in litigation, including administrative fees, facility 
rental charges, and arbitrator compensation.300 These can 
substantially reduce the prevailing party’s net recovery. 
Coding captured whether the parties addressed arbitration 
costs at all and whether they adopted a loser-pays rule.  
Arbitrator qualifications: Arbitration “folklore” has it that 
arbitrators have special expertise that ensures efficient, 
accurate results.301 In terms of professional background and 
experience, however, a legally trained arbitrator will probably 
look much like a state or federal judge assigned to preside over 
commercial disputes.302 Thus, if parties want an arbitrator 
with particular expertise or training, they must contract for it 
directly. Otherwise, the administering institution (if the 
contract designates one) will decide these matters. Coding 
captured whether the parties (i) imposed any expertise 
requirement, (ii) required industry expertise, or (iii) required 
legal training. 
Number of arbitrators: Changing the number of arbitrators 
can alter decision-making dynamics.303 For example, an 
arbitrator on a three-member panel must not only reach a 
                                                                                                     
41–42 (Tex. App. 2007) (reaching the opposite conclusion with respect to AAA 
rules). 
 300. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee 
Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 729, 736–42 (2006) (discussing arbitration costs and 
the AAA fee structure). 
 301. See Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract 
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 40–43 (1999) (noting this widespread 
but potentially inaccurate view of arbitration). 
 302. For example, AAA arbitrators need at least ten years of senior-level 
professional or legal experience, among other qualifications, but the eligibility 
criteria do not mention industry or transactional expertise (or even legal 
training). See Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 91, at 15 (noting that, 
unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators are appointed from the AAA 
national roster); see also Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA 
National Roster of Arbitrators, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N 1–2 (listing the 
qualification criteria for admittance to the national roster of arbitrators). I do 
not know of data on the average age or professional experience of AAA 
arbitrators. As of 2008, the mean age of federal judges at the time of first 
commission was just over fifty, and the mean number of years between the start 
of a career and the commission was approximately twenty-four. See Monique 
Renée Pournet, Kyle C. Kopko, Dana Wittmer & Lawrence Baum, Evolution of 
Judicial Careers in the Federal Courts, 1789-2008, 93 JUDICATURE 62, 66–67 
(2009) (reporting the appointment age of federal judges over time). 
 303. See Kapeliuk, supra note 104, at 270 (discussing dynamics on multi-
arbitrator panels). 
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decision but attempt to persuade fellow panelists, and this 
may require compromise.304 Institutional rules may give an 
administering institution discretion as to the number of 
arbitrators.305 Thus, if parties have a preference, they may 
need to express it in the contract. Coding captured whether 
the parties adopted any clause addressing arbitrator number 
and whether they adopted a clause requiring three arbitrators. 
Regulating merits discretion: Arbitrators have broad 
discretion to decide issues within the scope of the arbitration 
clause.306 If the result is one that the parties could have 
adopted by settlement, a court will probably uphold it, even if 
the court could not have ordered similar relief.307 Parties who 
want to limit this discretion must do so expressly in the 
contract.308 Contracts were coded for three methods of limiting 
discretion: (i) prohibiting relief that a court could not award,309 
(ii) establishing an appellate arbitration process,310 and 
(iii) final offer arbitration, which forces the arbitrator to choose 
between resolutions proposed by the parties.311 
                                                                                                     
 304. See id. at 292–97 (studying panel dynamics in investment arbitration). 
 305. See American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rule R-
16 and Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes Rule L-2 (providing 
for one arbitrator in cases involving less than $1 million and three arbitrators in 
cases over $1 million, but giving AAA discretion to vary the number); 
International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, Article 12(1–(2) 
(defining a default of one, but International Court of Arbitration of the ICC may 
appoint three). 
 306. See, e.g., Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 
1007 (Cal. 1994) (holding that, unless expressly limited by the contract, 
arbitrators may “fashion relief they consider just and fair under the 
circumstances . . . so long as the remedy may be rationally derived from the 
contract and the breach”). 
 307. See George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 580 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (ruling that an arbitrator manifestly disregards the law only by 
directing the parties to violate the law or by awarding relief forbidden by the 
contract). 
 308. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (noting that parties must 
expressly limit arbitrator discretion). 
 309. See, e.g., O’Flaherty v. Belgum, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004) (vacating award where contract forbade arbitrator to award relief “not 
available in a court of law”).  
 310. For example, the AAA offers separate appellate rules that parties may 
incorporate by reference. American Arbitration Association, Optional Appellate 
Arbitration Rules (2013). 
 311. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing final offer 
arbitration). 
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Procedural details before and during the hearing: Finally, 
contracts were coded for clauses addressing procedural 
matters that might arise before or during the hearing, 
including clauses that (i) specify the hearing location, 
(ii) authorize the arbitrator to rule on dispositive motions,312 
(iii) expand discovery rights by incorporating the relevant 
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or related 
state rules,313 and (iv) allow the arbitrator to issue 
subpoenas.314 
  
                                                                                                     
 312. See Alfred G. Ferris & W. Lee Biddle, The Use of Dispositive Motions in 
Arbitration, 62 DISP. RESOL. J. 17, 18 (2007) (discussing arbitrator authority to 
consider such motions; note that AAA Commercial Arbitration rule R-33 now 
explicitly authorizes dispositive motions).  
 313. See, e.g., PECO II, Inc., Supply Agreement § 18.5.4 (Form 8-K) (Oct. 2, 
2008) (“[E]ach party shall be entitled to conduct discovery in accordance with 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .”). These clauses expand discovery 
rights because the rules applicable in federal court usually permit more than 
arbitration rules. For example, AAA rules do not explicitly authorize depositions 
in many commercial disputes, while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow 
ten by default. Compare Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 91, at 19 
(providing, in R-22, for pre-hearing exchange of information but not explicitly 
authorizing depositions), with FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring leave of 
court to take more than ten depositions).  
 314. The contract cannot bestow subpoena power on the arbitrator, but the 
applicable law may authorize the arbitrator to subpoena a witness for trial or 
for discovery purposes. See, e.g., 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2455.1 (3d ed. 2014) (reviewing power 
to issue discovery subpoenas under federal law); UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT 
§ 17(d) (2000), 7 U.L.A. (2009) (authorizing subpoenas, including for discovery 
purposes). Contract terms authorizing subpoenas make clear that the parties 
have agreed to the arbitrator’s exercise of this authority.  
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Table 5. Proportion of Arbitration Agreements with 
Additional Custom Terms 
Scope of Arbitration:  
Carve-out 48.5% (83/171) 
Arbitrability Clause 7.6% (13/170) 
Arbitration Costs:  
Contract Allocates Costs 52.4% (89/170) 
Loser Pays Costs 18.3% (31/169) 
Arbitrator Number and Qualifications:  
Addresses Number of Arbitrators 72.8% (123/169) 
Requires Three Arbitrators 38.4% (63/164) 
Imposes Any Expertise 
Requirement 
25.3% (43/170) 
Requires Industry Expertise 18.8% (32/170) 
Requires Legal Training/Experience 10.0% (17/170) 
Regulating Arbitrator Discretion  
Only Relief Available in Court 1.2% (2/170) 
Final Offer Arbitration 4.7% (8/170) 
Appellate Arbitration Process 0.6% (1/170) 
Hearing Location and Procedure  
Specifies Hearing Location 85.7% (144/168) 
Authorizes Dispositive Motions 1.8% (3/170) 
Incorporates Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
7.6% (13/170) 
Allows Subpoenas 0.6% (1/170) 
Table 5 shows that parties who agree to arbitrate routinely 
customize at least some aspects of the process. Taking these 
arbitration-specific clauses into account, parties who agree to 
arbitrate adopt, on average, significantly more additional 
customized procedures (3.4) than parties who designate a judicial 
forum as the default setting for resolving disputes (0.83).315 
Clauses that specify the hearing location, allocate arbitration 
costs, and specify the number of arbitrators appear in over half of 
the contracts.316 Carve-outs appear in nearly half.317 A 
                                                                                                     
 315. Supra Table 5. The arbitration mean collapses some coding categories 
to avoid double counting, including the coding for clauses addressing arbitration 
costs, arbitrator expertise, and the number of arbitrators. As an example, any 
contract that addresses arbitration costs was counted as having one additional 
custom term, whether or not the contract adopts a loser-pays rule. Nevertheless, 
contracts with arbitration clauses had, on average, significantly more additional 
custom procedural clauses (M=3.4, SD=1.9) than contracts with forum selection 
clauses ((M=0.8, SD=0.9); t(263)=34.5, p<.001).  
 316. Supra Table 5. 
 317. Supra Table 5. 
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substantial minority of contracts impose arbitrator expertise 
requirements or require the loser to pay arbitration costs.318 Once 
again, however, relatively few contracts address routine 
procedural matters such as discovery, pleading, or evidence.319 
Notably, of the clauses addressing such matters, the most 
common simply elects an alternative bundle of discovery rules: 
those applicable in court.320 
V. Implications 
Normatively, the contracting practices described in Part III 
seem relatively unobjectionable. One potential objection to 
customized procedure is that parties might adopt rules that 
undermine the legitimacy of courts.321 For example, if parties 
dispense with the need for judicial impartiality, this might erode 
public perceptions of the judiciary and, over time, the quality of 
judicial decisions.322 Another objection is that parties might adopt 
procedures that impair the interests of non-parties.323 For example, 
they might adopt a clause that forbids third parties to intervene in 
their lawsuit.324 A third is that unfamiliar, party-designed 
                                                                                                     
 318. Supra Table 5. Cost-shifting clauses are almost as common as loser-
pays attorney fee clauses, which appear in 23.9% of all contracts and 25.7% of 
contracts with arbitration clauses. Supra Table 5. 
 319. Supra Tables 4, 5. Combining Tables 4 and 5, none of the following 
appeared in more than 5.3% of contracts: clauses that (i) shorten the statute of 
limitations, (ii) authorize more depositions than the relevant default, (iii) limit 
the ability to take depositions, (iv) authorize more document discovery than the 
relevant default, (v) waive hearsay objections, (vi) specify a method of serving 
process, (vii) expressly allocate the burden of proof, (viii) authorize an arbitrator 
to consider dispositive motions, or (ix) authorize an arbitrator to issue 
subpoenas (background law permitting). 
 320. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or analogous state rules, 
7.6% of arbitration agreements authorize discovery. 
 321. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1388 (suggesting that procedural  
modifications should not be enforced if they undermine the capacity of judges to 
engage in principled reasoning). 
 322. Robert Bone uses this example, although he does not suggest that such 
clauses are common. Id. at 1393 n.261. 
 323. Id. at 1373. 
 324. This is Michael Moffitt’s example, supra note 10, at 511, although he 
also does not suggest such clauses are common. 
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procedures might increase the expense of judicial proceedings, to 
the detriment of taxpayers.325  
These objections, of course, presume that parties actually 
modify judicial procedures. Yet, aside from forum selection and 
choice of law clauses, this rarely happens.326 When parties do 
change the rules, moreover, it is primarily to require the loser to 
pay attorney fees.327 This may impact the parties’ own incentives, 
but it hardly alters the judicial function or implicates third-party 
interests.328 
Parties more frequently customize the rules in arbitration.329 
This raises few normative objections in commercial contracts,330 
but it does complicate existing accounts of customized procedure 
by suggesting that the phenomenon is not as uncommon as many 
suppose. The findings here are generally consistent with those 
reported by O’Hara O’Connor et al. in their study of executive 
employment agreements, although they did not discuss some 
clauses (such as arbitrator expertise requirements) that appeared 
with some frequency in the present sample.331 On the whole, the 
findings also match those reported by Drahozal and O’Hara 
O’Connor and support their hypothesis that procedural 
customization consists primarily of allocating claims and 
remedies to an appropriate forum.332 But while few parties 
drafted extensive sets of custom rules, a handful of other 
                                                                                                     
 325. See Moffitt, supra note 10, at 514 (questioning whether disputes over 
custom procedural clauses might burden courts). 
 326. See supra Table 4 (documenting the rare use of custom procedural 
clauses). 
 327. See supra Table 4 (calculating that 23.9% of contracts require the loser 
to pay the winner’s attorney fees). 
 328. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English 
Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
141, 531 (1998) (exploring the incentive effects of fee-shifting). 
 329. See supra Table 5 (reporting use of custom procedure in contracts with 
arbitration clauses).  
 330. See Bone, supra note 8, at 1385–87 (exploring why party choice is more 
problematic in litigation than in arbitration). 
 331. See O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129, at 162–69 (reviewing 
arbitration clauses in CEO employment contracts). 
 332. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1991–92 (arguing that 
procedural customization consists mainly of the selection of bundled rules). So 
does the relatively common appearance of carve-ins—another mechanism for 
allocating claims and remedies to a preferred forum (in this case, arbitration).  
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procedural clauses made relatively frequent appearances.333 The 
question is what these findings imply for the debate over 
customized procedure.334 
A. On Negative Signals and Product Cycles 
The negative signaling account cannot easily accommodate 
the contracting practices described in Part III. This is not to say 
that negotiating parties never forego procedural modifications 
that might raise suspicions about their litigiousness or ability to 
perform.335 But the fact that nearly every contract alters the 
default rules of litigation in some way implies that such concerns 
are relatively muted.336 Moreover, recall that the most plausible 
hypothesis generated by the negative signaling account is that 
contracting practices will be relatively invariant when it comes to 
dispute resolution.337 There might be a few contract templates, 
but we should not see contracts vary in ways that suggest active 
negotiation. 
The sheer variety of approaches to dispute resolution, 
however, suggests that parties do not unreflectively adopt 
whatever dispute resolution clause appears in the initial drafting 
                                                                                                     
 333. See generally supra Tables 4, 5. 
 334. Given time and resource constraints, it was not possible to code for 
every conceivable form of procedural tailoring. For example, Table 4 may 
undercount clauses that shift the burden of proof because coding did not 
encompass some mechanisms by which parties can accomplish this, such as 
expansive termination rights. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 873–78 
(discussing impact of termination rights). Table 4 also may understate the 
prevalence of loser-pays attorney fee clauses. This is because some contracts 
include indemnity clauses that require one party to pay the indemnitee’s 
attorney fees, and these are not included in the fee-shifting count. This makes 
sense in most cases, as the indemnity covers only litigation brought by third 
parties and therefore does not shift fees in a dispute between the parties 
themselves. But some contracts also require “indemnification” for a party’s 
breach of contract. 
 335. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text (discussing how 
signaling concerns might deter bargaining over procedure). 
 336. See supra Figures 1, 4 (demonstrating that, although contracts do not 
extensively tailor procedural rules, nearly all contracts alter the background 
rules of litigation). 
 337. See supra notes 151–157 and accompanying text (discussing how 
custom procedural clauses might spread even if parties were generally reluctant 
to bargain over procedural rules). 
CUSTOMIZED PROCEDURE 1933 
template. Consider just two pieces of evidence. First, the data set 
includes multiple contracts for a number of companies, and these 
almost always include different dispute resolution provisions.338 
Second, arbitration clauses varied wildly in their structure and 
content; literally no two clauses were identical.339 The implication 
is that dispute resolution clauses are not mere boilerplate, 
migrating from contract to contract. Perhaps parties occasionally 
hesitate to negotiate procedural rules. But it is hard to imagine 
how so many templates could exist if signaling concerns were a 
serious deterrent to negotiation. 
There is also reason to question the contract-as-product 
account, which posits that novel procedural innovations will not 
take hold until an exogenous shock disrupts current drafting 
templates.340 One reason a shock might be necessary is that 
parties and their lawyers may doubt the enforceability of a new 
procedural clause.341 If the clause is not obviously superior to 
alternatives—for instance, because a court may not enforce it342—
there is little reason to adopt it.343 But if this were the 
                                                                                                     
 338. Compare, e.g., Supply Agreement dated Jan. 1, 2000, between Simcala, 
Inc. and UCAR Carbon Company, Inc. (bare-bones arbitration clause) (on file 
with the author), with Amended and Restated Supply Agreement dated Jan. 1, 
2001, between Simcala, Inc. and Dow Corning Corp. (mechanism for negotiation 
and a different arbitration clause) (on file with the author); compare 
Manufacturing and Supply Agreement dated March 12, 2003, between 
SkinMedica, Inc. and Smith & Nephew Wound Management (La Jolla) 
(requiring negotiation before arbitration) (on file with the author), with 
Manufacturing and Supply Agreement dated June 30, 2002, between Enhanced 
Derm Technologies, Inc. and SkinMedica, Inc. (no negotiation requirement; 
different arbitration clause) (on file with the author). 
 339. For example, contracts devoted an average of 311 words to the 
arbitration clause, but this figure ranged from a bare-bones arbitration clause of 
only nineteen words to a multi-page clause totaling 1,671 words. 
 340. See supra notes 158–170 and accompanying text (discussing the 
contract-as-product account). 
 341. Cf. Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 154, at 272–74 (finding 
terms in end user license agreements became more common as judicial 
enforcement became more certain). 
 342. Recall that enforcement uncertainty both reduces the expected value of 
a clause and introduces variance that the parties would (by hypothesis) prefer to 
avoid. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (addressing the cost of 
enforcement uncertainty).  
 343. David Hoffman doubts that enforcement uncertainty retards 
experimentation in this context, and he may be right. See Hoffman, supra note 
11, at 427 (suggesting that a significant shock, rather than doubts about legal 
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explanation, it is odd that we do not find more custom procedural 
clauses in arbitration, where enforcement is assured.344 True, 
parties who agreed to arbitrate were more likely to include a 
custom term addressing discovery, and this suggests that 
enforcement uncertainty may deter some parties from adopting 
novel clauses.345 Many procedural clauses, however, were 
extremely rare even in contracts that provided for arbitration.346 
Still, the contract-as-product account may be apt even if 
enforcement uncertainty does not suppress innovation.347 In 
many respects, it is curious that patterns of commercial contract 
innovation sometimes follow those observed in product markets. 
In the latter, transformative innovations can be obvious. Recall 
how computers transformed the cement industry by allowing the 
construction of vast, computer-controlled kilns.348 The value of a 
huge jump in production capacity is apparent.349 Producers that 
could invest in the new technology gained a dramatic competitive 
advantage; those that could not risked getting left behind.350 
                                                                                                     
enforceability, motivates changes to contracts). But enforcement uncertainty is 
at least one reason a shock might be necessary. Technological discontinuities 
prompt product innovation because the new technology offers “sharp price-
performance improvements over existing technologies.” Tushman & Anderson, 
supra note 158, at 441. If contracts follow this product innovation cycle, then a 
new clause will be adopted only if at least one party (or its lawyers) perceives it 
as an improvement over the old. This is unlikely if the clause cannot be 
enforced. For this reason, enforceability may be necessary to widespread 
adoption. Hoffman is surely right, however, that enforceability does not assure 
adoption, even for surplus-maximizing clauses. See infra notes 354–356 and 
accompanying text (discussing inertia in contracting practices and the relevance 
of external shocks). 
 344. See supra 217 and accompanying text (noting that modifications to 
arbitration procedures will almost always be enforced). 
 345. See supra note 294 and accompanying text (noting greater prevalence of 
discovery modifications in contracts with arbitration clauses). 
 346. See supra Table 4 (reporting prevalence of custom procedure in 
litigation and arbitration). 
 347. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 427 (expressing doubt that enforcement 
uncertainty deters the adoption of new terms). 
 348. See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (describing 
technological discontinuities in the cement industry). 
 349. See Tushman & Anderson, supra note 158, at 443 (documenting 
significant gains in efficiency resulting from computer-controlled kilns). 
 350. See supra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (noting the effects of 
the introduction of computers on the cement industry in the 1960s). 
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It is much harder to assign value to a clause in a commercial 
contract, especially when there is no secondary market to supply 
pricing information about contracts with and without the clause. 
Because drafters often have little solid evidence of the likely 
impact of a new clause, contract production is as much a social 
practice as an economic one.351 Transactional lawyers create or 
amend clauses because they believe the change adds value,352 
because they want to appear creative to clients and other 
lawyers, or simply because this is what transactional lawyers are 
supposed to do.353 Likewise, lawyers sometimes fail to make even 
beneficial changes to contracts.354 When this happens, there is 
evidence that external shocks, including salient legal 
developments, can provide impetus for change.355 If nothing else, 
the perception that the development requires a response may 
result in new contract language.356 
If a new clause became commonplace without a precipitating 
shock, this would present a more serious challenge to the 
contract-as-product account. But that did not happen for any of 
the clauses described in Part III. Thus, it remains possible that a 
                                                                                                     
 351. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 198, at 127–30 (discussing how 
lawyers explain patterns of innovation in contracts). 
 352. See, e.g., Coyle & Green, supra note 147, at 180–81 (recounting lawyer 
explanations for innovation in venture finance). 
 353. For a classic, if somewhat plaintive, description of the classic model of 
transactional lawyering, see Weidemaier et al., supra note 154, at 97–98 
(recounting a junior lawyer’s story—likely apocryphal—of watching a senior 
lawyer draft sovereign bond clauses from scratch, with a fountain pen). 
 354. See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (2013) 
(exploring why lawyers failed to modify sovereign bonds in the wake of a major, 
unexpected court decision); Weidemaier et al., supra note 154, at 98 
(hypothesizing that lawyers might fail to make changes to contracts in an effort 
“not to be seen as making changes to documents that are supposed to be 
standardized”). 
 355. For example, statutory developments with respect to sovereign 
immunity prompted lawyers to revise sovereign bond contracts, even though the 
statutes largely codified existing law. See Weidemaier, supra note 164, at 74 
(discussing the impact of changes in sovereign immunity law on sovereign 
bonds). 
 356. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 427 (“[C]hange will be largely responsive 
to highly-salient shocks, not the slow accretion of precedent.”). 
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high profile judicial opinion or other salient event would cause 
the widespread adoption of new procedural clauses.357 
B. Coarse, Not Granular, Procedural Tailoring 
On the whole, the findings discussed in Part III are 
consistent with the account offered by Drahozal and O’Hara 
O’Connor, which stresses that many procedural clauses entail 
high specification costs.358 Yet, their account does not fully 
capture the diversity of customized adjudication, which includes 
more than simply an election of bundled litigation or arbitration 
rules, supplemented as necessary by a carve-out.359 Recall that 
some clauses, by definition, cannot appear in both litigation and 
arbitration.360 Parties cannot adopt a carve-in, for example, 
without first choosing litigation as the default option.361 If we 
consider only the relevant contracts—such as the subset in which 
it is possible to find each procedural clause—ten different clauses 
appear in roughly 20% or more of contracts.362 
  
                                                                                                     
 357. See Hoffman, supra note 11, at 428 (suggesting that high profile court 
decisions may constitute “sufficient, highly salient, exogenous shocks” that help 
new clauses to become widespread). 
 358. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing this account of procedural 
customization). 
 359. Cf. Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1991 (positing that 
customization primarily takes the form of a choice of bundled rules 
supplemented, in arbitration, by litigation carve-outs). 
 360. See supra notes 296–314 and accompanying text (discussing custom 
clauses specific to arbitration). 
 361. See infra Table 6 (showing that 19% of contracts contain a carve-in 
provision). 
 362. I am omitting arbitration, forum selection, and choice of law clauses. 
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Table 6 
Clause Prevalence 
Arbitration Location 85.7% 
Arbitrator Number (Any Clause) 72.8% 
Arbitration Costs (Any Clause) 52.4% 
Carve-out (from Arbitration) 48.5% 
Arbitrator Number (Panel of Three) 38.4% 
Arbitrator Expertise (Any Requirement) 25.3% 
Attorney Fees (loser pays) 23.9%363 
Carve-in (to arbitration) 19.0% 
Arbitrator Expertise (Industry 
Knowledge) 18.8% 
Arbitration Costs (Loser Pays) 18.3% 
The relatively common use of these clauses shows that 
commercial actors do more than allocate claims and remedies to 
their preferred forum and its bundled rules. But the list also 
reveals that customized adjudication occurs within a limited 
domain. With the (irrelevant) exception of clauses that specify the 
place of arbitration,364 each clause falls into one of the first three 
functional categories described in Table 1.365 The three categories 
encompass clauses that (1) designate a different bundle of 
procedural rules for a subset of disputes (carve-outs and carve-ins), 
(2) regulate arbitrator characteristics and incentives (number and 
expertise requirements), or (3) allocate adjudication costs and 
payouts (attorney fee-shifting and arbitration cost allocation).366 
The fourth category consists of clauses that alter timing 
rules, address service of process, specify pleading or discovery 
                                                                                                     
 363 An even greater proportion (38.5%) authorizes, but does not require, 
fee-shifting. See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing need to 
explicitly authorize fee-shifting, even in arbitration). 
 364 In a sense, this is not an exception at all because a clause specifying the 
place of arbitration can also incorporate bundled rules. For example, in 
international arbitration, the law of the situs typically governs the arbitration 
proceeding and any action to set aside the award. See Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(1)(e), June 10, 
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (allowing an award to be set aside “by a competent 
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,” it was made).  
 365 Supra Table 1. 
 366 The relatively frequent use of clauses that allocate arbitration costs is 
consistent with the findings of O’Hara O’Connor et al. in CEO employment 
contracts. O’Hara O’Connor et al., supra note 129. 
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rules, or dictate the rules of evidence or proof.367 Without 
exception, clauses in this category are extremely rare.368 The 
most common, which instructs an arbitrator to replace the 
designated arbitration institution’s discovery rules with those 
found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, appears in only 
7.6% of relevant contracts.369 That this is the most common 
clause in the fourth category only highlights the apparent 
reluctance of parties to specify the particulars of the adjudication 
process. After all, the clause simply replaces one set of bundled 
rules (arbitral discovery) with another that is equally, if not 
more, familiar (the federal discovery rules). This is, in effect, a 
modular approach to building procedure in which parties 
assemble a procedural regime from discrete portions of available 
off-the-rack rules.370 
What parties almost never do is write contracts that dictate 
procedure at the granular level of pre-trial and trial practice.371 
Instead, they allocate disputes to one or more forums and then 
make relatively “coarse” modifications to the forum’s bundled 
rules. I use the term as a shorthand way to describe clauses that 
alter adjudicator incentives or expertise or party incentives to 
invest in (or abuse) the process of adjudication. As an example, 
return to our hypothetical sales contract. Anticipating 
disagreements over product quality, Seller may worry that Buyer 
will file frivolous claims, hoping to use the threat of expensive 
discovery to extract concessions.372 Even if the claim has merit, 
Seller may fear that Buyer will abuse the discovery process.373 
                                                                                                     
 367 See supra Table 1 (describing types of procedural customization). 
 368 See supra Table 4 (reporting prevalence of custom procedure). 
 369 Supra Table 5. 
 370 Cf. Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and 
Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1188 (2006) (discussing boilerplate as 
modular contract component).  
 371 Except for clauses that specify a method for serving process (5.9%), not 
a single clause in the fourth category appears in more than 2.8% of contracts. 
Some, such as clauses that adopt alternate pleading standards, do not appear at 
all. Supra Table 4. 
 372 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 500–01 (1994) (discussing how plaintiffs may use 
discovery strategically to impose costs on the defendant).  
 373 By discovery abuse, I refer to the use of discovery to impose unjustified 
costs on an adversary, such as costs that are not likely to increase the accuracy 
of the adjudicator’s decision. 
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To mitigate these risks, the parties might agree to a clause 
imposing a loser-pays rule for attorney fees.374 Fee-shifting 
clauses have complex implications.375 However, the parties might 
reasonably expect a loser-pays rule to discourage the filing of 
frivolous and low-probability claims,376 reduce incentives to abuse 
discovery,377 increase litigation expenditures (and perhaps 
accuracy),378 and more fully compensate the injured party.379 The 
                                                                                                     
 374 Although background law sometimes authorizes fees to prevailing 
parties, this is rare. Thus, parties who want to impose a fee-shifting rule must 
do so expressly in the contract. See supra note 292 and accompanying text 
(discussing need to expressly provide for fee-shifting). 
 375 For different perspectives on the impact of fee-allocation rules on 
settlement behavior (assuming a lawsuit has been filed), compare Polinsky & 
Rubinfeld, supra note 328, at 143 (modeling the decision between going to trial and 
settling and demonstrating that, under a loser-pays rule, more low-probability 
plaintiffs go to trial), and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology 
of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 161 (1996) (“[B]y raising the stakes at trial, 
the loser pays system makes litigation itself more valuable and can discourage 
settlement.”), with Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee 
Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 159 (1984) (expressing uncertainty 
but suggesting that a loser-pays rule applied “against individual litigants 
relying on their own resources might well result in a greater tendency to settle 
claims”); see also Rhee, supra note 9, at 535 (explaining that a loser-pays rule 
produces more variable outcomes and, on the assumption that most litigants are 
risk-averse, may “work at the margin to systematically push cases towards 
settlement”). 
 376 See Rhee, supra note 9, at 555–56 (assessing the potential for fee-shifting 
to deter frivolous suits); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational 
Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L. REV. 1313, 1364 (2012) (discussing the potential for 
fee-shifting to deter strategic lawsuits). 
 377 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Background Paper: American Law Institute 
Study on Paths to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 891 (1989) (noting that fee-shifting for discovery abuse 
“reduce[s] one side’s ability to weaken the other’s settlement position (based on 
the merits) by forcing the adversary to incur substantial unreimbursable 
litigation costs”); see also David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which 
Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 10 (1985) 
(noting that without fee-shifting, parties in position to impose litigation costs on 
the other, as through discovery, may be able to extract favorable settlements). 
 378 See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the 
American Rule of Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company 
Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 335–37 (2013) (noting that under a 
fee-shifting regime, parties might spend more on litigation and the possibility 
that this would increase accuracy). 
 379 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation 
Under Strict Liability, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 18, 28–30 (2002) (exploring 
deterrence benefits of shifting the plaintiff’s cost of litigation); Thomas D. Rowe, 
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prospect of fee-shifting also may give Seller some assurance that 
Buyer will not abuse the discovery process.380 But the clause does 
not dictate what claims the parties may file or how they may 
employ pre-trial or trial procedures.381 
Or consider an arbitrator expertise requirement. Compared 
to a non-expert, an expert arbitrator can more easily evaluate the 
Seller’s performance.382 This changes the parties’ incentives in 
deciding what claims to bring and how much to invest in proving 
claims once they have been asserted.383 For example, parties who 
expect to arbitrate before an expert may be deterred from 
bringing frivolous claims but more willing to challenge 
performance defects that might escape the notice of a non-expert.384 
Again, however, the expertise requirement does not dictate any 
aspect of pre-trial or trial practice. 
The prevalence of modifications like these suggests that 
procedural contracting is less costly than is sometimes 
                                                                                                     
Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE 
L.J. 651, 657 (1982) (noting argument that, without fee shifting, injured parties 
may be denied full compensation). A fee-shifting regime may also encourage 
litigants to invest more heavily in proving claims once filed, and the parties may 
(or may not) value this effect ex ante. See Clinton F. Beckner III & Avery Katz, 
The Incentive Effects of Litigation Fee Shifting when Legal Standards Are 
Uncertain, 15 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 205, 206 (1995) (suggesting that fee shifting 
“encourages litigants to spend more in cases that they do bring”). 
 380 See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 377, at 10 (noting potential for 
fee-shifting to deter parties from using discovery rules to impose costs on an 
adversary).  
 381. Clauses allocating arbitration costs perform a similar function. Loser-pays 
clauses appear in 18.3% of arbitration agreements, and a much greater proportion of 
contracts expressly give the arbitrator discretion to shift costs. Institutional 
arbitration rules may allow this as well. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules, 
supra note 91, at 28 (providing, in R-47, that the scope of an award may include the 
assessment of fees, expenses, and compensation). 
 382. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing accuracy 
benefits of arbitrator expertise, at least in some cases). 
 383. For example, parties may need to educate a non-expert arbitrator about 
the commercial setting; they may decide to dispense with such proof if the 
arbitrator knows the industry. 
 384. This is one reason parties may choose arbitration over litigation, and it 
applies equally to the choice of expert versus non-expert arbitrators. See Steven 
Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 2 (1995) (noting that expert arbitrators might more accurately detect 
substandard performance). 
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assumed.385 Parties do not seem to find it prohibitively difficult to 
decide their preferred number of arbitrators or whether to 
require an arbitrator with industry expertise.386 Likewise, they 
have no obvious difficulty contracting over attorney fees or cost 
allocation rules.387 Indeed, most contracts go further, directly 
addressing the payouts available in any dispute.388 As Table 4 
shows, contracts routinely include waivers of consequential 
(69.9%) and punitive (40.8%) damages, and a surprisingly large 
percentage (19.2%) explicitly caps recoverable damages.389 If 
parties can decide ex ante that a consequential damages waiver 
offers net benefits across all future disputes, it should not 
surprise us that they can make similar judgments about how to 
allocate the lawyer fees and adjudication costs. 
The customized adjudication literature must develop an 
account of why clauses like these occur so frequently, while 
clauses that address pre-trial and trial procedure are so rare. 
This account may flow naturally from existing theory. Perhaps 
clauses that address costs and payouts, adjudicator number and 
identity, and similar matters offer greater benefits—in terms of 
improved performance incentives—than clauses that regulate 
granular aspects of adjudication procedure.  
Or perhaps these clauses appear more frequently because 
parties have enough information at the time of the contract to 
make an informed guess as to their value. It is noteworthy that 
contracts rarely restrict adjudicator discretion over discovery or 
fact-finding.390 An attorney fee-shifting clause, for example, 
diminishes party incentives to abuse discovery rules, but it does 
not prevent any party from seeking or receiving discovery in any 
                                                                                                     
 385. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1961–66 (discussing cost 
of specifying forum rules à la carte and suggesting that specification costs will 
often be prohibitive). 
 386. See supra Table 5 (noting that 72.8% of arbitration clauses designate 
the number of arbitrators and 25.3% impose an expertise requirement). 
 387. See supra Tables 4, 5 (finding that 23.9% of contracts require the loser 
to pay attorney fees and that 52.4% of arbitration clauses allocate arbitration 
costs). 
 388. See supra Table 4 (noting that 71.5% of contracts limit remedies). 
 389. Supra Table 4. 
 390. See supra Tables 4, 5 (reporting very infrequent use of clauses that 
regulate discovery or hearing procedures, with most appearing less than 5% of 
the time). 
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particular instance.391 By omitting strict rules from the contract, 
the parties both delegate the discovery question to the 
adjudicator and defer its resolution until a dispute actually 
happens.392 At that time, the adjudicator will have better 
information about the nature of the dispute and the evidence 
necessary to resolve it.393 One implication is that customized 
procedure will be rare when (i) deferring the decision offers 
significant informational advantages and (ii) parties have 
confidence in the adjudicator.  
This explanation, unlike the contract-as-product account, 
posits that contracts result from an essentially rational process. 
At the time of contracting, parties weigh the costs and benefits of 
up-front drafting precision against those of “back-end” 
adjudicator discretion.394 Most accounts focus on how parties can 
expressly vary procedural rules to facilitate this trade-off.395 But 
parties cannot select a procedural rule without making a similar 
trade-off.396 In some cases, it may be less efficient to specify 
procedure up front than to let the adjudicator create and apply 
procedure when the need arises.397 
VI. Conclusion 
Commercial actors do customize the rules of the adjudication 
game, in both litigation and arbitration.398 But they do not do this 
                                                                                                     
 391. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of 
loser-pays rules). 
 392. Forum procedural rules typically allow substantial discretion in such 
matters. See, e.g., Charles J. Moxley, Jr., Discovery in Commercial Arbitration: 
How Arbitrators Think, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 36 (2008) (discussing discretion 
over discovery in arbitration); United States v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 719 
F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting judicial discretion over discovery). 
 393. See Unbundling Procedure, supra note 15, at 1963–64 (noting that 
customization can inhibit arbitrator’s flexibility to tailor discovery ex post). 
 394. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 2, at 822 (discussing contracting as a 
trade-off between back- and front-end costs). 
 395. See id. at 817 (exploring the relationship between litigation and 
contract design).  
 396. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the difficulty in identifying optimal 
procedure and how procedural contracts can impair adjudicator flexibility). 
 397. Supra Part III.B.2.   
 398. See supra Part IV (demonstrating how parties change the background 
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as often, or as precisely, as one might expect from the theoretical 
literature on customized procedure. After choosing default rules, 
allocating costs and payouts, and (in arbitration) adjusting 
adjudicator incentives, parties seem content to let the process 
play out.399 The result is that judges and arbitrators retain their 
traditional discretion to control pre-trial and trial procedure in 
light of the information available at the time of the dispute. 
These findings suggest the need for a new direction in 
customized procedure theory. For one thing, they imply that 
normative debates over party-controlled procedure have little 
urgency.400 The more immediate implication is for matters of 
contract theory and design. Perhaps enthusiasts have overstated 
the benefits, or understated the costs, of many procedural 
clauses. Or perhaps contract markets remain stuck in some 
dominant paradigm, awaiting a major shock to catalyze 
procedural innovation. These and other hypotheses represent the 
next phase of research into customized procedure. 
                                                                                                     
rules of litigation).  
 399. See supra Part IV.C.3–4 (describing how parties tailor procedure 
beyond simply choosing a forum).  
 400. See supra notes 321–328 and accompanying text (noting that the rarity 
of procedural modification implies that normative debates are premature).  
